invisible Margin: Marginalization and Activism of Adivasi Women in Researches in Bangladesh by Priyadarshini, Aanmona
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
2012
invisible Margin: Marginalization and Activism of
Adivasi Women in Researches in Bangladesh
Aanmona Priyadarshini
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2012 Aanmona Priyadarshini
Recommended Citation
Priyadarshini, Aanmona, "invisible Margin: Marginalization and Activism of Adivasi Women in Researches in Bangladesh" (2012).
Master's Theses. Paper 827.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/827
  
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO 
 
 
“INVISIBLE MARGIN”: MARGINALIZATION AND ACTIVISM OF ADIVASI 
WOMEN IN RESEARCHES IN BANGLADESH 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN CANDIDANCY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
PROGRAM IN WOMEN’S STUDIES AND GENDER STUDIES  
 
 
BY 
AANMONA PRIYADARSHINI 
CHICAGO, IL 
AUGUST 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Aanmona Priyadarshini, 2012 
All rights reserved 
 
 
 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 I would like to thank all of the people who made this thesis possible, starting with 
my wonderful professors in the Women’s Studies and Gender Studies Program at Loyola 
University Chicago. I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Prudence Moylan. 
Her sage advice has put me back on track when I veered precipitously away from my 
early goals, and her friendship and encouragement have made the difference in this long 
and arduous process. Dr. Colette Morrow, the reader of my thesis, proved an excellent 
sounding board for me from the beginning of my time here and helped me for exploring 
new ideas and encountering new challenges. 
 I would also like to thank Loyola University Chicago and Institute of International 
Education (IIE) for providing the funds to complete my research and writing. Two years 
Fellowship and tuition award during the 2010-2012 academic years allowed me to make 
discernable progress on my master’s study and research. 
 I would like to thank my ex-professor Dr. Ainoon Naher. Without her support I 
would never have made it where I am today. Her constant encouragement has made me 
believe that I can be the one who I want to be. Finally, I want to give thanks to my 
indigenous friends, who have made me able to do this research by providing researches 
data from Bangladesh. I would like to give my thanks to Hari Kishore Chakma, Kabita 
Chakma, Shashwati Chakma, whose support gave me strength when I needed that.
 iv 
 
Moreover, I want to give my warm loves to all of my indigenous people, whose life 
struggles have prepared me for starting a battle, a battle for establishing justice.  
  
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii   
CHAPTER ONE: UNPACKING THE SELF AND EXPLORING THE VISION 1  
      Literature Review  3  
      Major Points of Research 6  
      Theoretical and Methodological Overview 6 
 
CHAPTER TWO: KNOWING FROM HISTORY 10  
      Knowing the “Other” 11  
     “Othering” through Militarization  18  
      Invisible “Other” 22  
    
CHAPTER THREE: PEACE IS NOT FOR WOMEN: A STORY OF GENDERED          
PEACE ACCORD 27  
      Known Part of the Peace Accord  27   
      Peace is not for Adivasi Women 30 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: REFUGEE IN OWN LAND 35  
      Eviction of Adivasi People from Their Land  35  
     “The Land Is Mine Too”                38 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: “LIVES ARE NOT OURS”: VIOLENCE AGAINST ADIVASI  
      PEOPLE                   43     
      Mainstream Analysis of Violence              43 
      Unseen Violence to Adivasi Women              45 
      Sexual Violence Against Adivasi Women             47 
      Post-violence Vulnerabilities of Adivasi women             51 
 
CHAPTER SIX: INVISSIBLE ACTORS IN POLITICS OF NATIONALISM         58 
     Rhetoric of Nationalism                58 
     Adivasi Women’s Invisibility in the Politics of Nationalism           62 
     Rising from Ashes: Unseen Activisms of Adivasi Women           66 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER            73 
     Problems for Establishing Solidarity              74 
     From Differences to Commonalities              79 
   
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION               87 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  96  
VITA                            101  
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
UNPACKING THE SELF AND EXPLORING THE VISION 
On the one hand (the Adivasi1 woman in Bangladesh faces) the stream roller of 
rape, torture, sexual harassment, humiliation and helplessness inflicted by the 
military and Bengalis, and on the other hand, she faces the curse of social and 
sexual discrimination. 2 
 
This statement was made by Kalpana Chakma, the Adivasi woman activist in 
Bangladesh, who was abducted in June 12, 1996 and still now is missing. Her own life 
tragedy and her depictions of the realities of Adivasi women’s lives explore the 
marginalization of Adivasi women in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh. In the 
context of the historical marginalization of Adivasi people from diverse ethnic 
communities in Bangladesh, this study will investigate how mainstream researches and 
writings, in books, research reports, on Adivasi issues have ignored women’s relegation 
by equating women’s distinctive problems with communities’ marginalization. 
Through this research I will explore Adivasi women’s subordination in diverse 
sphere of life and their activism against the power structure that mainstream researches 
have overlooked. I will also investigate the possible pathways of solidarity to challenge 
the systems of power that create control over Adivasi people’s lives. Thus this research 
will address following research questions: How does mainstream research and writing
                                                
1 The term “Adivasi” is used in Bangladesh as a synonym of “indigenous” people. 
 
2 Meghna Guhathakurta, "Women's Survival and Resistances," in The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Life and 
Nature, ed. Philip Gain (Dhaka: Society for Environment and Human Development, 2000), 91. 
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on Adivasi people’s deprivation demonstrate a patriarchal point of views? How and why 
is the marginalization of Adivasi women more intense and different from communities’ 
marginalization? How despite their active roles in social movement, do Adivasi women’s 
activisms remain unseen? Is intercommunity solidarity sufficient to end the power 
structure that discriminates against Adivasi people, especially women, or is transnational 
solidarity is necessary for broader social changes? 
Feminist researches in recent periods focus on the interconnections between race, 
ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, nationality and other social configurations to 
understand the unique nature of women’s subordinations and resistances. This study will 
use intersectionality approach instead of merely focusing on the state and Bengali 
Muslim communities’ domination over Adivasi people. It will show how ethnicity, class, 
gender, and sexuality together shape Adivasi women’s marginalization and activism 
against this marginalization, which has been ignored by majority of the academic and 
research initiatives undertaken in Bangladesh. This research will also argue for solidarity, 
based on common political cause, among marginalized people throughout the world 
based on their shared experiences for fostering broader social change. This is another 
issue that is not examined by scholars who focus on Adivasi people’s lives in 
Bangladesh. My research may stimulate Adivasi women to make coalitions based on 
their shared experiences and raise their voices against the current power structure by 
fostering a movement, which will transcend racial, class, ethnic, and religious boundaries. 
Moreover, by recognizing race, gender, class and sexuality as an integrated part of 
structure of power, my research can explore multifaceted dimension of realities in 
Adivasi women’s lives in Bangladesh, which typically are unseen and unheard. 
  3 
                                                                    
Literature Review 
The problem of this study – how mainstream researches and writings have 
overlooked violence and discrimination against Adivasi women in CHT, Bangladesh – is 
fundamentally shaped by its historical context. There are unequal power relationships, 
tensions, and conflicts between and among Adivasi and Bengali communities, as well as 
political and social marginalization and military aggression against the Adivasi hill 
people. Though violation of Adivasi people’s human rights is pervasive in Bangladesh 
some researches have only recently begun to address this concern. Among these 
researches, most focus on the overall marginalization of Adivasi communities rather than 
women’s situation. 
Some of the researches, for example, the work of Gain3 and Roy4, focus on how 
the state deprives Adivasi people by displacing them from their ancestor’s lands. The 
researches show the reasons and natures of conflicts between Adivasi communities and 
the state, multinational organizations, all of whom compete for control over and access to 
land and natural resources. But, none of these works explore how conflicts over land 
affects Adivasi women. Some researches, for example, Rashiduzzaman,5 and Panday and 
Jamil,6 investigates the inherent flaws in the CHT Accord that was signed by both 
                                                
3 Philip Gain, "Researved Forests Complicate Land Issues," in Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong Hill 
Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism, ed. Naeem Mohaiemen (Dhaka: Drishtipat Writers' 
Collective, 2010). 
 
4 Devasish Roy, "Resisting Onslaught on Forest Commons in Post-Accord CHT," in Between Ashes and 
Hope: Chittagong Hill Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism, ed. Naeem Mohaiemen 
(Dhaka: Drishtipat Writers' Collective, 2010). 
 
5 M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord: Institute Features and Strategic 
Concerns," Asian Survey 38, no. 7 (1998). 
 
6 Pranab Kumar Panday and Ishtiaq Jamil, "Conflicts in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: An 
Unimplemented Accord and Continued Violence," Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009). 
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Adivasi leaders and state in 1997 and explore the failure of Peace Accord, violations of 
human rights in post-accord eras and the problems and barriers for the implementation of 
the peace Accord. These researches do not investigate how Adivasi women’s problems 
are absent from the peace Accord. Similarly, Mohsin 7 and Schendel8  explore the politics 
of nationalism and activism of Adivasi political groups. But they do not mention Adivasi 
women’s activism in the context of national and local politics in Bangladesh. All of these 
works address the issues—violations of human rights, genocide, and massacre in CHT. 
However, some of the studies merely mention sexual violence against Adivasi women 
without considering the long-terms socio-political, physical and mental consequences of 
this violence. The commonalities between all of these researches are that they all try to 
analyze Adivasi people’s marginalization from patriarchal point of view by focusing on 
Adivasi males’ experiences and ignoring women’s voices. Even when these researches 
considered Adivasi women’s marginalization, instead of focusing on diverse socio-
political sphere of lives, they just looked at women’s sexual vulnerabilities. Secondly, 
none of these researches focus on the intersectional relationships among ethnicity, class, 
gender and sexuality. Finally, none of these researches recommend creating solidarity 
across culture, nationality, ethnicity, and class to overcome this oppression. 
My research project will add knowledge in this field by considering the 
interconnected nature of women’s marginalization in diverse area of their lives, such as 
their displacement from ancestor’s lands, erasure from the peace Accord, their 
                                                
7 Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh, Second ed. 
(Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2002). 
 
8 Willem van Schendel, Wolfgang Mey, and Aditya Kumar Dewan, The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Living in a 
Borderland  (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2000). 
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experiences of sexual assault and violence, and their unrecognized activism. In this 
regard I will consider Guhathakurta’s researches on Adivasi people of Bangladesh,9 
which have used women’s points of view to explore unheard and unseen gendered 
violence and marginalization as well as activisms among Adivasi women. The second 
reason for my departing from traditional research is that I will consider the interrelated 
relationships between ethnicity, class, gender and sexuality for analyzing Adivasi 
women’s marginalized positions in society. In this regards I will consider Collins’s work 
on race, class, sexuality, and gender in the United States, which sees these distinctive 
systems of oppression as interlocking parts of one overarching structure of domination 
instead of starting with gender and then adding in other variables such as age, sexual 
orientation, race, social class, and religion.10  Thirdly, my research is departs from 
traditional researches on Adivasi people in Bangladesh, as I will advocate for solidarity 
among Bengali and Adivasi women in Bangladesh as well as worldwide based on 
common political choice. At this point, I will consider Mohanty’s work, as she believes 
that in order to effect social change women have to establish solidarity while recognizing 
their differences.11  This solidarity will not depend on geography or any particular race or 
class group.  Rather, it will transcend nation-states and communities’ boundaries and 
bring women who share similar political interests into a common platform. 
 
 
                                                
9 Guhathakurta, "Women's Survival and Resistances." 
 
10 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Conciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment  (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
 
11 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity  
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003). 225. 
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Major Points of Research 
As was discussed earlier, this study will focus on three major areas. First, in order 
to analyze Adivasi people’s subordination, I will explore the issues that mainstream 
researches and writings address. Displacement from land, socio-political barrier for the 
implementation of peace Accord, violation of human rights, and national and local 
politics and activism are the main area that mainstream researches have addressed to 
understand Adivasi communities and especially Adivasi men’s subordination. Majority of 
the researches have not considered the distinctiveness of women’s marginalization. This 
will lead me to my second quest, the investigation of how all of these issues have 
different affects on Adivasi women’s lives, marginalization and activism. Finally, to 
overcome this situation I will advocate for solidarity between diverse ethnicities in 
Bangladesh and worldwide marginal people. As the structure of domination is too strong 
and broad, nothing can be achieved by establishing solidarity only within a single 
community.  This does not mean that I will not recognize differences among diverse 
communities. Clearly, there are differences among different ethnic minority communities, 
but their common experiences of marginalization can open diverse paths to deal with the 
problems. 
Theoretical and Methodological Overview: 
To address the stated research objectives, I will use feminist standpoint 
epistemology and methodology and theoretical premises intersectionality. It is not 
possible to separate the methodology of Feminist Standpoint from its theoretical 
principle, as it is a theoretical and methodological whole where the philosophical 
premises lead to the methodological guidelines. Feminist standpoint epistemology and 
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methodology require that I begin with marginal people’s lives, acknowledge my 
standpoint, account for the power structures that shape my research and recognize 
differences and agency among people whose experiences I have studied.12 
Focusing on Adivasi women in Bangladesh, I believe that I begin with marginal 
women’s lives, as these women are marginal in term of their ethnicity, class, gender and 
sexual identities. The research topic I have chosen is directly related to my social beliefs, 
ideologies, experiences and feminist stance. Being a Bengali woman, a member of 
minority Hindu community and lower-middle class I face sexual, religious, class and 
racial marginalization in Bangladesh as well as in the United States. 
My marginal identities and experiences of oppression have shaped my interests to 
understand social identities and their marginalization within a complex, and interlocking 
system of oppression along the lines of race, gender, class and sexuality. By considering 
feminist theoretical premises of intersectionality, I want to analyze this marginalization 
within what Collins calls a “ ‘matrix of domination’ in which difference is conceptualized 
as a range of interlocking inequalities.”13    This conceptualization helps me avoid 
reinscribing the dominant view on social identities. It also helps me to grasp multiple 
perspectives on the marginalization of Adivasi women. Moreover, using feminist 
intersectional theoretical approaches, I will investigate pathways for establishing 
solidarity among marginal people from diverse background based on their common 
                                                
12 Kum-Kum Bhavnani, "Tracing theContours: Feminist Research and Feminist Objectivity," in Feminist 
Perspectives on Social Research, ed. Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Michelle L. Yaiser (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 67. 
 
13 SN Hesse-Biber and ML Yaiser, "Difference Matters: Studying Across Race, Class, Gender, and 
Sexuality," in Feminist perspectives on social research, ed. SN Hesse-Biber and ML Yaiser (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 114. 
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political choices, so that they can challenge the power structure to foster boarder social 
change. This understanding and research modality will help me to consider my research 
subject as an actor with full of agency and potentialities. 
In this research I am not doing any fieldwork by studying “real” people or 
participating in “real” field events to collect data. According to Schwara, there are two 
ways to collect data: discursive and communicative, where the first one is for the 
observation and evaluation of material sources like text and image and second one is 
based on active participation of the researcher in the research sites.14  My project will use 
the former means of collecting data. It will also employ ethnographic content analysis, 
which is a qualitative content analysis technique used to locate, identify, and thematically 
analyze texts to “document and understand the communication of meaning.”15   In 
contrast to the quantitative content analysis, which relies on hypothesis testing, deductive 
research and predetermined categories, ethnographic content analysis conceptualizes 
document analysis as fieldwork, allows concepts to emerge inductively, and insists on 
reflexivity and the interactive nature of the investigator, concepts, data collection and 
analysis.16 
For content analysis I will consider published sources such as journals, books, 
articles and electronic sources including blogs, organizational web pages and Bengali 
newspapers as my primary sources, which give me direct accessibility toward my 
research subject. These materials are relevant to my project for several reasons. First of 
                                                
14 Stefan A. Schwara, "Ethnologie im Zeichen von Globalisierung und Cyberspace," Mitteilungen der 
Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien 129(1999): 271. 
 
15 David L. Altheide, "Ethnographic Content Analysis," Qualitative Sociology 10, no. 1 (1987): 68. 
 
16 Ibid. 
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all, my research objective is to explore how mainstream researches and writings consider 
Adivasi women’s marginality. To address this issue, I have to focus on these primary 
sources. Second, by exploring the real incidents, case studies and data about the 
subordination of Adivasi women, some of these primary sources will enable me to 
understand the contemporary realities of Adivasi women’s lives in Bangladesh. Third, by 
revealing women’s own experiences of marginalization, some of these sources will help 
me to grasp women’s point of view instead of examining them through patriarchal 
perspectives. Therefore, the populations who are the focus of my project are positioned as 
partners in the research rather than as subjects in a hierarchically defined relationship 
between them and an external specialist. Furthermore, the knowledge that emerges from 
my research will be produced in community rather than individually.  
     
10 
CHAPTER TWO 
KNOWING FROM HISTORY  
Mainstream history is nothing more than a selection of facts, which are 
conditioned by the bestowed political interests of the dominant group – race, class or 
gender – to present a particular “image” of the past to the future, and to legitimize 
discriminated political moves.1 When we are taught to learn from history we are being 
taught to look at the past from the standpoint of the powerful. However, knowing history 
does not mean we have to believe everything that is written down in the documents. 
Rather, it means to find out how and why a particular history was created in a certain 
period of time to assure certain interest, and it means analyzing present experiences of 
discrimination and dominations in the intermingling contexts of past and present. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I am going to explore the history that has been trying to 
establish Adivasi people in CHT, Bangladesh as “Other.”  
Cartographic anxieties have been imprinted on the statecraft of South Asian states 
from its very inception.2 One of the reasons behind these anxieties is laid in the action of 
nationalist leaders of South Asia who opted for the French model of nationhood for 
building their nation-states. According to Brubaker,  
In the French Tradition, the nation has been conceived in relation to the institution 
and territorial frame of the state . . . Nationhood is centrally expressed 
                                                
1 Raymond Williams, "The Long Revolution," in Theory of Criticism, ed. Raman Senden (London: 
Longman, 1988), 41. 
 
2 Meghna Guhathakurta, "Cartographic Anxities, Identity Politics and the Imperatives of Bangladesh 
Foreign Policy," South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 2, no. 3 (2010): 1.  
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in the striving for cultural unity. Political inclusion has entailed cultural 
assimilation, for regional cultural minorities and immigrants alike.3  
 
South Asian political elites have followed this model by choosing the 
dominant/majority community as the model nation and establishing a culturally 
homogenous population.4 Therefore, minority communities have encountered alienation 
from every sphere of lives and have become the “other” of the dominant group, who are 
required by state to be assimilated with the mainstream. But, what happens when they do 
not want to assimilate? How does the state want to control its “other” in the name of state 
security? How is “otherness” imposed on the people through the process of making them 
invisible in all spheres of lives? By focusing on Adivasi people’s experiences in 
Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, I will try to address these questions in rest of the 
chapter.  
Knowing the “Other” 
 
Bengali self-identification is so preponderant in Bangladesh that other self-
identifications have no spaces in the national rhetoric. The State considers Bangladesh as 
a land of Bengali people, where minority ethnic and religious groups are “other.” 
According to Mohsin, there are thirteen ethnic groups in CHT, Bangladesh, who identify 
themselves as Adivasi or indigenous people.5 They are: Chakma, Marma, Tripura, 
Tanchangya, Riang, Murang, Lushai, Bunjogees (Bawm), Pankhos, Kukis, Chak, Khumi, 
Mro and Kheyang. Most of the Adivasi people in Bangladesh live in CHT, which 
                                                
3 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenships and Nationhood in France and Germany  (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992). 1. 
 
4 Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh, Second ed. 
(Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2002). 2. 
 
5 Ibid., 12. 
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occupies a physical area of 5.093 sq. miles, constituting ten percent of the total land area 
of Bangladesh. The region comprises three districts: Rangamati, Khagrachari, and 
Banderban. According to the 1991 Census, the total population is 974,465 out of which 
501,145 (51 per cent) belong to groups of different ethnic origins and 49 per cent are 
Bengalis.6 It is to be noted that about 70,000 refugees who were in the Indian state of 
Tripura from 1986 to 1988 are not included in the Census report.  
Since 1980, when M.N. Larma, the legendary Adivasi political leader, formed a 
local political party named Parbatta Chattagram Jana Sanghati Porishad (PCJSS) and 
demanded a separate nationhood for diverse hill people, educated middle class Adivasi 
people has started to refer themselves as “Jumma” nation.7 The word Jumma has its 
origins in Jhum, which has been the traditional mode of cultivation of the Adivasi people 
in CHT. PCJSS invoked this particular nomenclature to infuse Adivasi people with a 
sense of pride in their past, their traditional system and value.8 Despite the term “Jhum’s” 
links with the past and indigenous ways of life, it has failed to create a universal appeal to 
one and all Adivasi people, because of its biasness to the dominant ethnic group Chakma. 
Ever since the celebration of World Indigenous year in 1993, the term indigenous or 
Adivasi has gained in prominence among Adivasi people in Bangladesh.  
The potentiality of this term for establishing indigenous people’s rights globally, 
create an appeal to Adivasi people in Bangladesh. Therefore, Adivasi people in CHT 
consider this identity as their political identity that differentiates them from Bengali 
                                                
6 Meghna Guhathakurta, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Accord and After: Gendered Dimensions of 
Peace," (UNRISD, 2004), 5. 
 
7 Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh: 189. 
 
8 Ibid., 191. 
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people. This identity is their weapon for resisting discriminations caused by state and 
establishing justice.  
  However, the Bangladeshi state that was established on the ideology of single 
national identity has rejected Adivasi people’s claim for indigenous status from the very 
beginning. Prime Minister of Bangladesh and BNP chairperson, Begum Khaleda Zia 
hindered Adivasi people from claiming a priori rights to their land, by refusing to sign the 
1994 UN Charter of Indigenous Peoples, and claiming “there are no aboriginal peoples in 
Bangladesh and Bengalis are indigenous to Bangladesh.”9 Though there are always 
disagreements on policy decision between two major parties –Awami League (AL) and 
Bangladesh National Party (BNP) –they came to the same platform surrounding on the 
issue of Adivasi people. Therefore, AL Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu Moni has appeared to 
reflect the earlier BNP minister's statement, when she says, "Bangladesh does not have 
any indigenous population. Bangladesh rather has several ethnic minorities and tribal 
population."10  
According to the Bangladeshi nation-state these minority ethnic groups are “Upojati” 
or sub-nation and therefore, in 2010, the CHT Affairs Ministry, headed by a Jumma 
minister, issues a memo ordering that Jumma not be referred to as "Adivasi" or 
"indigenous," in any government documents. 11 But, they are not “Upojati” or sub-nation 
that government is claiming. They identify themselves as the indigenous people of 
                                                
9 Lamia Karim, "Pushed to the Margins: Adivasi Peoples in Bangladesh and the Case of Kalpana," 
Contemporary South Asia 7, no. 3 (1998): 308. 
 
10 Naeem Mohaiemen, "Connecting Visible Dots (1997-2010)," in Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong 
Hill Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism, ed. Naeem Mohaiemen (Dhaka: Dristipat Writers' 
Collective, 2010), 33. 
 
11 Ibid. 
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Bangladesh. We can consider the major criteria of indigenous people, which are 
determined by the United Nations, to figure out whether they are indigenous people of 
Bangladesh. However, to do this we have to remember that the criteria that UN-body has 
chosen, are not absolute. Considering the diversity of indigenous peoples, UN-system 
body has not adopted an official definition of “indigenous” yet. Instead the UN-body has 
developed a modern understanding of this term based on the following: 12   
1. Self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by 
the community as their member.   
2. Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies.  
3. Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources. 
4. Distinct social, economic or political systems. 
5. Distinct language, culture and beliefs form non-dominant groups of society. 
6. Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as 
distinctive peoples and communities. 
There are some ambiguities in these criteria, which give rise to complexities in the 
identification of indigenous group. The fourth, fifth and sixth characteristics of 
“indigenous” identity emphasize on essential and “true” nature of culture, beliefs and 
economic-political systems. However, in an era of globalization, in the context of neo-
liberal governing system, patterns of life in any societies and groups are now increasingly 
shaped by the connections between societies, which are situated in local and global 
                                                
12 “Who are Indigenous People,” UN Organization, accessed on May 15, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf  
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level.13 Therefore, there is no ethnic group who has completely distinct language, culture, 
and socio-economic, political systems. Moreover, when state power, which is so 
pervasive, tries to submerge minority ethnic people’s identity and infuse them in 
mainstream systems, then it is very difficult to identify the “authentic,” “distinctive” 
characteristic of any given group. But, focusing on the other three criteria – self-
identification, historical continuity and especial relationships with the environment – can 
be a possible way to analyze CHT Adivasi people’s indigenous status.  
The Adivasi people from different ethnic groups in CHT, identify themselves as 
indigenous people of Bangladesh. They are the inhabitants of Chittagong Hill Tracts 
since pre-colonial era, when Bengali people were not there. They have especial 
relationships with their land and nature through Jhum cultivation, which has been the 
traditional slash and burn cultivation of the Adivasi people in CHT. The government of 
Bangladesh banned this Jhum cultivation in the name of environment protection. But, 
Jhum is more than a mode of cultivation, it is a way of life of adivasi people and it is 
integral to their religious, social and cultural ethos and it denoted their special 
relationships with their nature and land.14 So, Adivasi people in CHT meet the criteria of 
self-identification, historical continuity and especial relationships with their land, which 
are necessary to claim indigenous status according to UN-body. 
These people also mostly, not totally, have satisfied the other characteristic of 
indigenous status that emphasize “distinctive” ways of life. The Adivasi ethnic groups in 
                                                
13 Margaret L. Andersen and Patricia Hill Collins, "Syatem of Power and Inequality," in Race, Class, and 
Gender: An Anthology, ed. Margaret L. Andersen and Patricia Hill Collins (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Cengage Learning, 2010), 81. 
 
14 Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh: 191. 
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CHT differed from each other in terms of language, customs, religious believes, and 
socio-political organization. Each Adivasi group living in CHT speaks its own dialect and 
language, which are not Bengali though for the forced cultural “assimilations” we can see 
the presence of several Bengali words in Adivasi languages. Islam shows that the mother 
tongue of the Chakmas is a perverted form of the Bengali language written in Burmese 
characters; the Marmas speak Arakanese, a dialect of Burmese; the Tipras, a language of 
their own akin to Kachari; the rest of the tribes speak different Assami Burmese tongues 
of their own.15 The religion of the most of the ethnic communities of CHT is Buddhism. 
The members of other ethnic communities are Hindu and animistic in religion though all 
Hindu are not Adivasi, as most of the Hindu in Bangladesh are Bengali. So, their socio-
cultural characteristics are not completely distinctive from dominant socio-cultural 
pattern. But, considering the major different socio-cultural values and practices of 
Adivasi people, we can say that they belong to indigenous community.  
Despite their valid claim for the recognition as indigenous status, the Bangladeshi 
government have not only denied Adivasi people’s indigenous status, but also denied to 
give them their rights as citizens. The political leaders of Bangladesh chose Bengali 
people, Bengali language, Bengali culture and Islam as the main ingredients for building 
a homogenous nationhood, with which Adivasi people have no connections. There by, 
the Bangladeshi state produces the Adivasi as a subject of willed ignorance in the 
national imagination, and the production of that ignorance enables the state to control the 
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Adivasi populations.16 By making them invisible in every single sphere of socio-cultural, 
political, economical life in Bangladesh, the state and its organizations establish Adivasi 
people as the “other” of Bengali nation.  
The process of making them “other” is a continuation of the colonial legacy. It 
started during the British colonial period, when Europeans rulers and scholars invented a 
derogative identity for Adivasi people. According to Tripura “Europeans saw themselves 
as the pinnacle of the evolution and progress; the societies that they colonized were 
below and behind them in various stages of cultural evolution, the “tribal” societies being 
at the very bottom.”17 Therefore, they consider indigenous people as “primitives,” 
“savages,” and “wild hill tribes.”18 The post-colonial state follows the legacy of 
colonialism by continuing colonialist classificatory schemes. Therefore, like their 
colonial rulers Bangladeshi state and majority of Bengali people consider Adivasi people 
as “Pahari,” (Wild Hill People) “Upojati” (Sub-nation), and “backward” people.  
However, Adivasi people cannot be the members of “tribal” society. Because, a 
tribal society is generally understood to be one in which social, political and economical 
relations are organized around Kinship.19 Obviously, being the members of neo-liberal 
nation-state, the subjects of global and state power systems, and laborers of capitalist 
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production system, Adivasi people are not a “tribe.” Theoretically, they are the citizens of 
Bangladesh. But, in reality they are not. Because, they do not fulfill the status of 
citizenship, “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community,”20 which 
includes civil, political and social rights and obligations.  
In Bangladeshi state they are less than citizen. They only exist in the imagination 
of dominant Bengali group as their “other.” Adivasi children are born as the ‘other,’ 
before they understand the significance of being the “other.” Being the “other” they feel 
different, feel distinct from mainstream people. Being the ‘other’ they remain outside the 
circle, outside the main scenario. They live on the edges, on the margins, on the 
periphery. They encounter the sense of isolation, apartness, disconnectedness and 
alienation. The next section will explore how historically rulers have ensured Adivasi 
people’s status as “other” through militarization.  
“Othering” through Militarization 
Leaders of the nation-state invent the state’s “others” by homogenizing different 
ethnic communities under the rubric of dominant group. This homogenization establishes 
hegemony on minority communities, who are expected to assimilate themselves with the 
mainstream. But, when minority people resist against state, then state establishes them as 
its “other,” as a threat to state’s security. One the one hand, the state considers this 
“other” as “outsider,” who is invisible from every sphere of national life. On the other 
hand, they are very visible as a threat to state security in the imagination of national 
leaders. To make them more invisible and vulnerable in the name of nation-state’s 
security, the state controls its “other” through its military and other “law” enforcement 
                                                
20 T.H. Marshall, Sociology at the Crossroads  (London: Heinemann, 1963). 14. 
    19 
  
 
organizations. However, like identity formation of Adivasi people, the technique and 
ideology for controlling people by military, is the continuation of the legacy of 
colonialism. In this section, I will explore how like their colonial ancestors, Pakistani and 
Bengali rulers have created control over Adivasi people’s lives through militarization.  
Up to 1713, Adivasi people of Chittagong Hill Tracts were independent, and ruled 
by different chiefs from different communities.21 After that period chiefs surrender to 
Mughal rulers by agreeing to pay tax. According to Mohsin, CHT was ceded to the 
British East India Company in 1760.22 She claimed “The British policy in the CHT was 
guided by two main objectives: a) protection of the political, economic and military 
interest of the British; b) keeping the hill people segregated from the Bengalis.”23 
However, the policy of segregation from Bengali people did not serve Adivasi people’s 
political interest. Rather, by keeping Adivasi people distanced from the turbulence of the 
Indian nationalist movement, British rulers secured their own political interests. Adivasi 
people didn’t accept colonial rules and regulations without resistances. Led by Rono 
Khan, the deputy of the chief, they declared war against the Company for increasing the 
revenues. The war came to an end in 1787 through the surrender of Chakma chief Jan 
Bakhsh Khan, after British had imposed an economic blockade on the Adivasi people in 
CHT.24 Mohsin shows that after the chief’s surrender, gradually the CHT was militarized 
by the British, who set military camps in the interior of the hills to maintain “law and 
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order” and used political and military means to force the loyalties of the Adivasi people.25  
In 1947, the British gave part of the CHT to Pakistan.26 Therefore, Adivasi people 
in CHT, who were mostly Buddhists, Hindus and animists, suddenly found themselves as 
“other” in a state that was projected on an Islamic identity. The partition divided the 
ethnic communities of the CHT among the three newly independent states of India, 
Pakistan and Myanmar and the consequence of this division was that once populous 
ethnic communities became minority groups overnight.27 Adivasi people resisted against 
the incorporation of the CHT into Pakistan. Therefore, from the beginning of the 
construction of Pakistani nation-state, Adivasi people were recognized as “traitors.” They 
are branded as “pro-Indian,” as Chakma Chief raised Indian flag on August 15, 1947 
though general people remained oblivious to this incident.28 The new Pakistani 
government became suspicious about Adivasi people’s allegiances and made some major 
changes that changed Adivasi people’s lives forever. Karim explores the key changes that 
was made by Pakistani government, 
In 1962, the Kaptai Dam was constructed in the Hill area, flooding over 54,000 
acres of arable land and displacing nearly 100,000 Chakmas. The Pakistani 
government abolished the indigenous police force, which had jurisdiction over the 
Hill areas after the 1900 Regulations, and brought the area under the direct 
administration of the East Pakistan police force. In 1964, the government finally 
succeeded in abrogating the excluded territory' status of CHT, and threw the area 
open to Bengali settlers and to its so-called modernization efforts.29 
 
                                                
25 Ibid., 144. 
 
26 Karim, "Pushed to the Margins: Adivasi Peoples in Bangladesh and the Case of Kalpana," 305. 
 
27 Ibid., 4. 
 
28 Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh: 37. 
 
29 Karim, "Pushed to the Margins: Adivasi Peoples in Bangladesh and the Case of Kalpana," 305. 
 
    21 
  
 
Moreover, like their colonial rulers, Pakistani ruling elite also relied heavily on the 
military to impose its dominance over Adivasi people who appeared to pose a threat to 
their hegemonic construction.30 
 After the liberation war in 1971, CHT belonged to Bangladesh that became an 
independent country, but the fate of Adivasi people worsened. The Bangladeshi state has 
followed the same military policy of Pakistan and utilized state’s militia for imposing the 
dominance of Bengali’s upon the Adivasi people of CHT. According to Mohsin, 
militarization was triggered by three factors.31 Firstly, Adivasi people’s neutral position 
during the war of 1971, have established them once again as “razakar,” or “traitors” in a 
new nation state. Secondly, during the Pakistan regime CHT had served as a training base 
for the Mizos, who supported Pakistani forces during liberation war. Thirdly, when the 
Bangladeshi constitution declared Bengali to be the basis of nationhood in the new state, 
Adivasi people sought for their political and cultural autonomy. Moreover, Manobendra 
Narayan Larma, the legendary Adivasi leader, established a political group named 
Parbattay Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) on March 7, 1972. The party added 
a military wing to fight against Bengali freedom fighters, who started to kill innocent 
Adivasi people after the independence of Bangladesh. Considering all of these factors, 
including the military move of PCJSS, as a threat to sate’s sovereignty, Bangladeshi 
government embarked upon the militarization of CHT in the name of “national security.”  
 The military is spread out all over the CHT. The Bangladesh government has 
deployed one third of its total army in the CHT, where there are over 230 army camps, 
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more than 100 BDR camps and over 80 police camps in the area.32 Apart from being 
physically present and controlling CHT’s administration, the military is also posing a 
constant threat to Adivasi people’s economic, cultural, political and religious freedom by 
conducting massacre, violating human rights, and intimidating Adivasi people’s 
existence. Military has become a weapon of state to submerge Adivasi people’s voice and 
experiences. However, military is not the only one means through which government 
makes Adivasi people invisible from all sphere of life. In the next section, I will explore 
those spheres, in which Adivasi people remain as “invisible other.”   
Invisible “Other” 
 The Adivasi people of Bangladesh are ubiquitously absent as subjects, as actors, 
as agents in the national imagination; they are invisible in the administrative, educational, 
economical systems, and in the popular media. The state sponsored education system 
produces students who are ignorant of ethnic and religious diversity within 
Bangladesh, as primary and secondary textbooks do not explore Adivasi people’s diverse 
history and cultures from their points of view; rather project them as “primitive,” 
“backward,” “sub-nation” groups. The state-controlled television occasionally features 
programs on the cultural life –especially songs and dances –of Adivasi people that do not 
inform viewers about the history, political organization, and customs of Adivasi 
communities.33 These silences make them invisible in the mainstream national lives. 
 The “othering” of the Adivasi people also takes place through hegemonic 
historical narratives of Bangladesh. The history of Bangladesh as conceived by Bengali is 
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a history of glorious Bengali leaders and freedom fighters. There is no place for Adivasi 
people in this history, except as “villain.” In 1971, several of the key members of the 
Chakma community joined forces with the Pakistani Army during the Bangladeshi 
freedom struggle. As a result of this, not only Chakma, but also other ethnic groups of 
Adivasi people have become “unpatriotic” and “traitors.” While it is true that some 
Chakma leaders did support the Pakistani rulers in 1971, it is equally true that many 
Adivasi people took active part in liberation war of Bangladesh by fighting alongside 
Bengalis and offering protection to the Bengalis fleeing the Pakistani military.34 Despite 
their active participation in the process of nation-state building, Bengali nationalism tries 
to hide that Adivasi people too have been an integral part of Bangladesh. 
 They are alienated not only from dominant national narratives, but also from 
mainstream economic, political systems, and state’s constitution. Bangladeshi state 
banned their traditional mode of cultivation system “Jhum” and transformed their 
common property into private property. The government denied approval to the legal 
status of two large political parties –United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) and 
Parbattay Chattagram Jana Sanghati Parishad (PCJSS) –that represent CHT Adivasi 
people. The constitution of Bangladesh has remained silent about the existence of ethnic 
minorities with distinctive identities, which is also an indication of the marginal status of 
the Adivasi people in Bangladesh.35 Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister, 
in 1975, addressed the Adivasi people as brethren and told them to become Bengalis and 
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join the mainstream of Bengali culture.36 The constitution of Bangladesh in 1972 
followed Rahman’s ideology of nationalism, as it claimed, “By nationalism all citizens of 
Bangladesh are Bengali.”37 The new constitution claims that all citizens of Bangladesh 
are Bangladeshi, but the constitution always considers Bangladeshi as the synonym of 
Muslim Bengali. This alarming absence of the Adivasi people in the socio-cultural, 
economic, and political map of Bangladesh explains why they have become “invisible 
other” in the mind of dominant Bengali group that has little interest in the Adivasi 
communities.  
In spite of their invisibility in the mainstream scenario of Bangladesh, their 
marginality, their experiences are not an entirely untold story. Rather, the discrimination, 
deprivation and exploitation in the CHT have attracted attention of national and 
international scholars and audiences.38 But, in the context of historical marginalization of 
Adivasi communities, Adivasi women’s distinctive experiences remain submerged. Both 
as women and as members of marginalized communities Adivasi women face different 
forms of discrimination, inequality and injustice and they have unique strategies for 
resisting against power structures. On the one hand, they are sexually, economically, 
politically discriminated by dominant ethnic group Bengali and their militia. On the other 
hand, by living with patriarchy, Adivasi women face gender-based discrimination and 
violence in all spheres of lives within their household and their communities. They are 
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involved in all aspect of production, but men have a monopoly on inheritance.39 Very 
often Adivasi women raise their children in the absence of their husbands, but they have 
no parental rights over their children. They take all responsibility of housework and also 
often earn the major part of their household expenditures, but they encounter sexual 
violence within their family. They are more involved in religious ritual, but as monks and 
general women they have to follow the advice of their male peers and they are denied 
entry to monasteries because it is believed by Adivasi Buddhist men that women bring 
impurity to work and prayer.40 They participate actively in the social-movement against 
all discrimination caused by state, but they are not the ones who takes decision in social 
matters as well as in household.41 Therefore, their relegated position within their own 
communities as well as Bangladeshi state establish them as a distinctive “other.” 
Their suffering within their own communities as well as household remain 
invisible and unheard, as Adivasi women often become reluctant to speak about the 
discriminations to protect their community and family “honor.” Their perceptions and 
experiences of ethnic, class, and gender discrimination in Bangladesh have shaped the 
nature of their silence. Mainstream Bengali communities pose several stereotypical ideas 
about Adivasi communities, which includes that Adivasi people are responsible for their 
own suffering. This cultural prejudice of mainstream Bengali society fosters Adivasi 
women’s fear of ramifications on their families and communities and thereby motivates 
women to remain silent about their marginal positions in their own communities.  
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The interconnected nature of Adivasi women’s marginality remain mostly 
invisible in academic arena, as to address the issues of Adivasi people in CHT, 
mainstream scholars and writers have ignored Adivasi women’s relegation by equating 
women’s distinctive problems with communities’ marginalization. Even when these 
researches consider Adivasi women’s marginalization, instead of focusing on diverse 
socio-political sphere of lives, they just look at women’s sexual vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, mainstream researchers and journalists try to analyze Adivasi people’s 
marginalization from patriarchal point of view by focusing on indigenous males’ 
experiences and ignoring women’s voices.  
Therefore, the multifaceted experiences of Adivasi women have remained all 
most unheard, their unique marginalization, agency, strategy have remained mostly 
unseen. In this way, Adivasi women remain more invisible than Adivasi men. They exist 
as the “other” of “other,” and margin of margin. In the next few chapters, I will explore 
how state leaders, activists, scholars and journalists have alienated Adivasi women from 
those issues – peace Accord, land rights, violence against Adivasi people and politics of 
nationalism –that are considered as main issues for talking about Adivasi people. My aim 
is to see how patriarchy as well as state has shaped Adivasi women’s experiences of 
economical, political and sexual marginalization and possibility of activism, which is 
rarely addressed by scholars. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PEACE IS NOT FOR WOMEN: A STORY OF GENDERED PEACE ACCORD 
History shows us that the peace accords and treaties have been signed between 
dominant and minority racial, ethnic groups or between powerful and politically-
economically weak nation-states to end conflicts. In most of the cases, minority groups 
have been betrayed and peace has lost its meaning in their lives. In this way, peace has 
only existed in the paper of treaties. However, scholars and politicians have debated with 
each other on the issue that whether peace treaty of a particular geo-political region is 
implemented properly or not. But, scholars often have paid little attention that how some 
groups of people have become invisible in the journey towards peace. This chapter will 
explore how Adivasi women are alienated from the peace building process and the peace 
accord that was signed by AL government and one branch of PCJSS in 1997. 
Known Part of the Peace Accord  
 Scholars and journalists, who have researched on the CHT Peace Accord, mostly 
have focused on the issues of what was this Accord and how the government has failed to 
implement the Accord. According to them, the governments of Bangladesh always has 
tried to solve CHT problems by using law enforcement institutions. In 1997, when 
various international organizations, human rights groups and donor agencies created 
pressure on government to reinvigorate the peace process in the CHT, AL government 
took initiative for establishing peace in the CHT. As a result they started peace talking 
with the local Adivasi party PCJSS. Finally in 1997 government and PCJSS signed the
28 
     
    
Peace Accord.1 After that PCJSS army laid down their arms and the party demobilized its 
military. However, the Accord was not supported by all sections of Adivasi society. 
Groups within the PCJSS, including its influential student wing, which subsequently 
helped form the UPDF on December 26, 1998, raised a strong voice of opposition against 
the Accord by claiming self-determination for the indigenous people of the CHT, and 
arguing that the 1997 Accord failed to address the fundamental demands of the Jumma 
people.2  
 According to Pandey and Jalil,3 and Rashiduzzaman4 The major objectives of the 
1997 peace Accord included protection of the land rights of the indigenous people, 
revival of their cultural uniqueness, rehabilitation of internally displaced people and 
refugees who had left the country, withdrawal of the military from the CHT (with the 
exception of permanent military establishments), and self-government through regional 
and district councils. Unfortunately, the undemocratic, fundamentalist and discriminatory 
attitudes of nation’s major political parties and bureaucrats, and the presences of military 
in the CHT, have worked as obstacles against the implementation of the Accord.5  
Therefore, though more than thirteen years have passed after signing of the 
Accord, the main issues of the Accord, have been left unimplemented. Firstly, their 
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demand for recognition as the Jumma nation has been denied, instead CHT is recognized 
as a “Tribal” inhabited area and term “Upojati,” that means sub-nation, is being used to 
identify Adivasi people, while Bengalis are considered as “full nation.”6 In this way, the 
state reaffirmed the dominance and hegemony of Bengali “nation” within the states of 
Bangladesh. Secondly, though the Regional Council Act and the three Hill District 
Council Acts were enacted, they were never properly enforced, so the special 
administrative system could never be made effective.7 Thirdly, in a symbolic gesture 
towards fulfilling the 1997 Accord, the AL government removed thirty-five temporary 
Army Camps from the region, which represents only 10% of total camps in the region.8 
Fourthly, though the Land Commission was formed, it was unable to resolve any land 
disputes. The Jumma refugees who returned from India and the internally displaced 
Jumma people were not rehabilitated, but rather, Bengali settlers were counted as 
internally displaced people and efforts were made to rehabilitate them in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts in violation of the peace Accord. 
Therefore, scholars have pointed out correctly that basically this Accord is a 
hegemonic treaty, which secures the interests of dominant Bengali group, while violates 
Adivasi people’s rights. As the basis for sustainable peace in CHT, the Accord lacks the 
principle of justice, human rights and democracy, which are necessary to create a 
nonhegemonic society. In spite of scholars’ thorough analysis of power imbalance within 
the Accord, most of them have failed to see how Adivasi women are absent in this Peace 
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building process. Researchers have investigated the inherent flaws in the CHT Accord 
and explored the failure of Peace Accord, violations of human rights in post-accord eras 
and the problems and barriers for the implementation of the peace Accord. However, they 
have failed to investigate how Adivasi women’s problems are absent from the peace 
Accord. The next section will explore how the government and PCJSS both have 
alienated Adivasi women from the peace building process and why women’s 
contributions in the peace process are significant.  
Peace is not for Adivasi Women 
 Though it is trues that there is male dominated culture in the practices of 
soldiering and military conscription, it does not mean that men essentially associate with 
war, while women associate with peace. Feminist theorists however have ferociously 
challenged the essentialist notions of masculinity and femininity that establish men and 
women as each other’s opposite party. It has been noticed in different conflicts that 
women are not only victims of war but also active participants. de Silva claimed in a 
press conference that in Sri Lanka, some male fighters perceived women Tamil 
paramilitaries to be more violent than their male colleagues.9 Therefore, clearly woman is 
not a potential agent for building peace only for her biology. 
 However, as human being, like their male partner, women are equally responsible 
for establishing peace. But, the CHT peace Accord completely ignored Adivasi women’s 
roles in peace building process, which make this Accord as a gendered agreement.10 We 
can examine the gendered nature of the peace Accord by focusing on how Adivasi 
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women are excluded from three steps of peace building process: 
1. Adivasi women were absent in the negotiation process through which the 
government and PCJSS had come to an agreement and signed the Accord. 
2. The language of peace Accord does not reflect Adivasi women’s rights. 
3. The Accord does not mention Adivasi women’s involvement in effecting 
peace building process in post accord period. 
 Women, especially from marginal communities, have distinctive understanding 
for peace building process. According to Enloe, women have a unique angle in peace not 
due to women being nurturing; rather, it seems more to do with knowing oppression from 
their own lived experiences.11 Women have special experiences of alienation, 
discrimination and marginalization that give them special insights for understanding the 
structure of unequal relationships, the relationships that create the context for conflicting 
situation. Women are more likely to see a continuum of violence that intersects gender, 
race, class, ethnicity and stretches from the home to street to the battlefield. Therefore, 
the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, passed on October 
31, 2000, that urges member states to ensure increased representation of women at all 
decision-making levels in national, regional, and international institution for the 
prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts.12 In spite of women’s unique 
insights for establishing peace, and the UN’s demand for women’s participation in 
conflict resolution process, not a single Adivasi woman was present in the peace talk. It 
does not mean that Adivasi women were not active in their socio-political movement in 
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that particular historical moment. Rather, they were very active in insurgency period, 
which started from late 70s and ended in 1997. They learned how to use arms and fight 
against the Bengali army, they acted as Adivasi soldiers informers. They established the 
women’s wing of PCJSS and organized local women against state laded discrimination 
before the peace-Accord was signed. The Organizing Secretary of HWF Kalpana 
Chakma, a great example of an Adivasi women leader, was abducted from the Hills on 
the eve of 1996 general elections allegedly by an army officer. But, when the government 
and PCJSS signed the Accord, both of these groups just ignored Adivasi women’s roles 
for making that very day possible. 
 Apart from this, the Accord only strengthens the masculine values of politics and 
secures male members’ interests. By ignoring Adivasi women’s distinctive problems, the 
Accord has failed to secure Adivasi women’s rights. According to Mohsin13, in the 
formal peace Accord, the membership of the Regional Council did provide for reserved 
seats for women members. Among the 25 seats, 12 were male (“tribal”) and two female 
(“tribal”) and among the non-Adivasi six were male and one female. This reflects gender 
imbalance and male hegemonism and disregards Adivasi women’s sacrifices and 
participation in the peace-building activities. Moreover, the Accord makes no provisions 
for the rights of women. A specific case is Adivasi women’s right to land. The PCJSS has 
remained silent on this issue, despite waging a struggle that had land as its core agenda. 
Moreover, this Accord has made no provision for the rehabilitation of the rape victims or 
domestic violence victims. Indeed, the woman question remains subsumed under the 
national question, not only by the state, but also by the local Adivasi male leaders. 
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Therefore, we see Shantu Larma, the leader of the PCJSS to say, “I do not believe in 
women empowerment, once the nation is empowered women would automatically be 
empowered.”  
 Because of the male-centered interests and values in the politics of nationalism, 
women are not only ignored in the language of the Accord, but also from the post-accord 
involvement in managing peace process. Despite the fact that Adivasi women had not 
only been the worst sufferers and victims of the state violence, but they had also been an 
integral part of the autonomy movement, there was no mention about Adivasi women’s 
possible responsibility in the peace building process in future. It is evident that in post-
accord era women have suffered severe violence.14 But, most importantly, it is Adivasi 
women’s organization –Hill Women’s Federation –that has brought the violence issue 
into the public forum through networking with the Bengali women organizations. They 
have carried on their movement both within and outside the Hill Tracts. Their workers 
dared not go home for years for fear of being arrested.15 They are fighting for the rights 
of Adivasi women and also taking necessary steps for establishing solidarity within 
broader socio-political contexts, which is necessary for securing peace in the CHT. 
Unfortunately, both the government and the Adivasi leaders have failed to recognize the 
power of these women for protecting peace in post-accord era. 
Considering the facts that there was no Adivasi woman who participated in the 
peace talks, woman questions are missing from the Accord and there is a total absence of 
                                                
14 Sadeka Halim, "Insecurity of Indigenous Women," in Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong Hill Tracts 
in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism, ed. Naeem Mohaiemen (Dhaka: Drishtipat Writers' 
Collective, 2010), 185. 
 
15 Guhathakurta, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Accord and After: Gendered Dimensions of Peace," 
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women from the entire peace process, we can claim that this was a gendered agreement. 
The gender question has remained unresolved both within the purview of hill politics as 
well as between hill organizations and Bengali civil society groups. Politicians blame 
each other for the failure of the implementation of this Accord. Researchers have found 
out the inherent flaws within the Accord. But, very few one have identified that peace 
cannot be established without engaging the one half of the population in the CHT. 
Scholars’ male-gaze often fails to see that peace Accord will remain as a fairy tale if 
peace cannot be assured for women too. 
 35 
CHAPTER FOUR 
REFUGEE IN OWN LAND 
 According to UN reports there are more than 370 million indigenous people 
spread across 70 countries worldwide. UN claims “they are the descendants - according 
to a common definition - of those who inhabited a country or a geographical region at the 
time when people of different cultures or ethnic origins arrived. The new arrivals later 
became dominant through conquest, occupation, settlement or other means.”1 Therefore, 
in spite of the fact that the indigenous people are the original inhabitants of several 
geographical areas, history has become the witness of the alienation of indigenous group 
from their land by dominant groups. Native American Indian, Australian Aborigines, 
First nation people of Canada, Adivasi people of India and millions of other indigenous 
people have gone through this process. Land grabbing by dominant groups has 
devastating effects on indigenous communities. In this chapter, I will explore how the 
government has grabbed land from indigenous people and how the eviction process 
affects Adivasi women.  
Eviction of Adivasi People from Their Land 
Bangladeshi government has always been interested in Adivasi people’s land 
rather than focusing on their wellbeing. This becomes evident in the announcement of 
Area Commander Maj. Gen. Manzur, who said, “We don’t want you. You can go off
                                                
1 “Who are Indigenous People,” UN Organization, accessed on May 15, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf  
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Whenever you please. We just want your land.”2 Therefore, the major conflicts during the 
internal war (1973-1997) between Bengalis and Adivasi Hill people were largely oriented 
around competition for control over and access to lands and other natural resources.3 In 
the post-accord era, the conflict for land continues for the failure of implementation of 
the Accord. Moreover, Bangladesh state has continuously rejected the demand of 
indigenous status of Adivasi people since according to international law that means 
conceding them certain land rights.4 Instead of establishing Adivasi people’s lands rights, 
the government denies them in three ways. 
 Firstly, like colonial rulers the Bangladeshi government alienated them from their 
land by ascribing private property rights upon them and abolishing their traditional 
cultivation system Jhum. In pre-colonial times, the Adivasi people in the CHT practiced 
slash-and-burn cultivation, which is locally known as Jhum. They did not have title deeds 
for their Jhum land or even for their homesteads, as lands were shared by whole 
community.5 But, to increase revenue and control Adivasi people’s migration from land 
to land, which were required for Jhum cultivation, British rulers prohibited this traditional 
cultivation and introduced private property laws.6 They offered private land rights only to 
those Adivasi people who agreed to adopting plough cultivation. Under the post-colonial 
states of Pakistan and Bangladesh private rights of freehold and leasehold were given to 
                                                
2 Sagheer Faiz and Naeem Mohaiemen, "Peace in Our Time? (1715-1997)," in Between Ashes and Hope: 
Chittagong Hill Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism, ed. Naeem Mohaiemen (Dhaka: 
Dristipat Writers' Collective, 2010), 27. 
 
3 Roy, "Resisting Onslaught on Forest Commons in Post-Accord CHT," 125. 
 
4 Guhathakurta, "Women's Survival and Resistances." 
 
5 Gain, "Researved Forests Complicate Land Issues," 122. 
 
6 Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh. 
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those Adivasi and Bengalis operating timber, rubber and horticultural plantations.7 The 
Jhum cultivators were supposed to be “rehabilitated” and given settlement with title 
deeds, but that did not happen with most of the Adivasi people, who practically became 
landless.  
 Secondly, the government has grabbed their land by establishing reserved forest 
in the land of Adivasi people for commercial establishment. There are growing numbers 
of timber and rubber industries in the CHT driven by profit-oriented capitalist production. 
Roy claimed that in the post-accord era, competition over natural resources also started to 
involve a growing number of “stakeholders” – external investors, multilateral 
development banks, bilateral development or “donor” agencies of OECD governments, 
and development-related institutions with local, national or international ties –who have 
come out as open actors after the signing of the Accord and who have become interested 
in Adivasi people’s lands in the name of “development.”8 Therefore, Adivasi people not 
only become landless, but also they have to deal with the complex interplay of economic 
and “development” forces. 
 Thirdly, the government has evicted Adivasi people from their ancestors’ land by 
settling landless Bengalis in the CHT. Government legitimized Bengalis’ migration to 
CHT by arguing that CHT is a vast region, the size being one tenth of Bangladesh. 
Therefore, general Bengalis people also started to believe that million Bengalis could be 
settled down here.  However, according to 1956 census the population of Hill Tracts was 
half million, and amount of cultivable land for per family was 3 ! to 4 acres, which were 
                                                
7Shapan Adnan and Ranajit Dastidar, Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts  (Dhaka: CHTC, IWGIA, 2011). 40. 
  
8 Roy, "Resisting Onslaught on Forest Commons in Post-Accord CHT," 125. 
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not sufficient for the survival of those families even in that particular period.9 Moreover, 
a scientific research in CHT in 1960 showed that only 3.2% land was suitable for all 
purpose of agriculture, 15% of land was suitable for fruit gardens and 77% of land was 
solely suitable for afforestation.10 Despite the scarcity of useable land in the CHT, 
government settled around half a million Bengalis people there by its military and civil 
administration through three phases during 1979-84.11 Bengalis’ migration to the CHT 
has destroyed the socio-cultural, economical and political structures of Adivasi people 
and made them minority in their own land. 
 Therefore, conversion of Jhum cultivation, introduction of private property laws, 
commercial plantation activities and massive migration of landless Bengalis have chased 
Adivasi people out of their traditional homeland and into an uncertain future. Since, the 
conflicts between Adivasi people and Bengalis happen surrounding on land issues, 
several researchers have focused on how Adivasi people have been up rooted by 
dominant group. However, scholars rarely consider the facts that how alienation from 
land has affected Adivasi women distinctively. In the next section, I will explore how 
Adivasi women’s experienced have shaped by the eviction process.  
“The Land is Mine Too” 
 Several ecofeminists have claimed that women are inherently closer to nature. 
However, their argument has been denied by several feminists who believe that there is 
no essential and natural relationships between women and nature. The essentialism in 
                                                
9 Tanvir Mokammel, Teardrop of Karnaphuli (Karnaphulir Kanna in Bengali), 20:50, 2005 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=gMVb7e1hPnQ 
 
10 Mohsin, "State Hegemony," 67-68. 
 
11 Ibid. 
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ecofeminism that heated debate within feminist world in the 1980s pushed several 
ecofeminists into analyzing the relationships between women and nature differently. 
Therefore, feminist like Shiva and Mies12 see these relationships by drawing parallels 
between the subjugation of women and nature. This notion helps to avoid essentialist, 
sexist and socially constrained reasoning because it focuses on broader trends, instead of 
essentializing “female” traits. Moreover, this notion is also helpful to recognize the fact 
that whenever nature has been exploited brutally, women members of the community 
also went through severe threat.  
 The Adivasi women from CHT have also become vulnerable when their nature 
has been abused by capitalist rulers. They also have distinctive relationships with nature 
and their lands, which make them rebellious for securing their lands for themselves and 
for their families. “This is my land, my forest, I will not leave my land” – stated one 
Adivasi woman in the documentary titled “Teardrops of Karnaphulir” 13 though these are 
the exact words that most of the Adivasi women utter for expressing their anxiety about 
being evicted. Their anxiousness is not baseless. When Adivasi people are alienated by 
dominated group, then Adivasi women suffered most, as their security, mobility, 
livelihood, equal participation in the cultivation always structured by their relationships 
with their lands. 
  State-sponsored Bengali in-migration and presence of military camps in Adivasi 
people’s lands not only led to the displacement of the hill people in the CHT but also 
                                                
12 Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism  (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1993). 
 
13 Tanvir Mokammel, Teardrop of Karnaphuli (Karnaphulir Kanna in Bengali), 20:00, 2005 
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created security problems for them, for both the men and the women. But, for women the 
problem is different, as the hostile environment affects their daily activities by putting 
threat on their mobility. There are large numbers of army and other security personnel 
and Bengalis in the rural areas of the CHT, where indigenous women move about to 
collect water, fuel and fodder. Adivasi women are sexually and verbally harassed and 
assaulted by security personnel and Bengali settlers, when they have to go outside their 
home for their daily activities.14 Therefore, being insecure in their own land Adivasi 
women often feel the urgency for decreasing their mobility.  
  Moreover, Adivasi women suffer from the new emerging context that demands 
that they engage in the capitalist market system. There are an increasing number of 
women headed households in the CHT because of the absence of male members who 
either were killed or forced to flee to India. Women who are left without any male 
members or the male members, who are capable for bearing the household expenditure, 
become responsible to search for new means of livelihood both within and outside the 
CHT. This exposes Adivasi women to new forms of vulnerabilities. On the one hand, 
they are deprived from getting a proper wage for their labor or good price for their 
product. For instances, Halim15 showed that for selling their products, hill women from 
the remote areas used to visit bazar areas that are dominated by Bengali people. Some of 
her interviewed women mentioned that in most cases of market transactions they are 
deprived of the actual price of the farm produce by unscrupulous Bengali traders and 
                                                
14 Halim, "Insecurity of Indigenous Women," 185. 
 
15 Sadeka Halim, "Human Rights and The Indigenous Women: A case Study from CHT," in State of 
Human Rights in Bangladesh Women's Perspective (Dhaka: Women for Women, 2002). 
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middlemen. On the other hand, they face sexual and physical abuse in their workplace. 
Sexual violence is a part of Adivasi women’s daily lives. But, it not only happens in the 
CHT. Even when educated Adivasi women migrate to other city for new livelihood, they 
face same problem. For instance, Naher and Tripura’s one of the informants –an Adivasi 
female graduate –told them that she took up a job at a real estate firm and at the end of 
the first day of work, her boss told her that she was hired because as a “tribal” woman, 
she would be expected to be less inhabited in interactions with clients and fully prepared 
to fulfill “any wishes” of clients.16 
 Apart from the, eviction of Adivasi people and presence of Bengali settlers and 
the Army also have affected Adivasi women’s education. In the time of insurgency or in 
any conflict situation, Adivasi people sell their cattle and lands at dirt-cheap prices and 
most of the time they would not be able to buy them back again. Therefore, the family 
income decline and often the price would be the education of the girl-child.17 Moreover, 
the number of high schools for girls is lower than the numbers of boys and the 
government often tries to hide this issue by claiming that there is not sufficient land. 
However, thousand of acres of Adivasi lands are transformed, as reserved forest in the 
name of “development,” while women’s development has remained overlooked. Adivasi 
girls who live in remote areas find it difficult to attend school. Because, there is always 
threat for sexual violence from settler Bengalis and Army, who grabbed their homeland 
and bound them to live in a rural place from where attending school becomes impossible 
for girls. 
                                                
16 Ainoon Naher and Prashanta Tripura, "Understanding Violence Against Indigenous Women in 
bangladesh," The Journal of Social Studies 123(2009): 10. 
 
17 Guhathakurta, "Women's Survival and Resistances," 80. 
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 However, Adivasi women not only suffer for the government policy for land 
grabbing, but also for their traditional patriarchal rules for inheritance. With the exception 
of the Marma Adivasi ethnic group, women in Adivasi communities do not have equal 
inheritance rights. Since men inherit the wealth and land of the family, in Adivasi 
societies men are more valued than women.18 Without economic freedom they have a 
minor role in the family. Moreover, widows cannot inherit wealth if they remarry without 
having a son. Their inheritance status within their own communities along with 
government’s forced eviction policy and settlement of Bengalis in Adivasi lands have 
pushed them to live in the margin.  
   In conclusion, it can be said that the government’s forced alienation of Adivasi 
people from their land and state sponsored settlement of Bengalis in Adivasi land have 
destroyed Adivasi people’s ways of life, their socio-cultural, economical and political 
structure. But, Adivasi women encounter distinctive marginalization as both the state, and 
their own patriarchal societies deprived them of their land rights. On the one hand, 
Adivasi women experience the lower status than men within the societies, as they do not 
have inheritance rights. On the other hand, they encounter state violence. Therefore, 
Adivasi women have to juggle between their own communities and protecting themselves 
from the ongoing war. 
                                                
18 Ibid., 84. 
 
    
43 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
“LIVES ARE NOT OURS”: VIOLENCE AGAINST ADIVASI   PEOPLE 
 
Violence toward minority groups is very common in a conflicting situation. The 
dominant group, who has access to the state’s economic and political power, often denies 
that their acts, and policy constitute organized violence. Powerful elite groups legitimize 
their violence by characterizing it as necessary measure to ensure order and respect of 
law. When researchers and scholars analyze state violence against minority groups they 
often focus on the general scenario of the violence and assume that it affects all minority 
people equally. However, the effects of violence on women have a distinctive nature. 
Despite the fact that violence against women is so widespread, it has been always under 
reported. This chapter will explore Adivasi women’s life, struggle and complex situation 
in the CHT, where they negotiated with vulnerability, and injustice within the context of 
traditional patriarchal system and militarization. 
Mainstream Analysis of Violence 
 
 There are very few researches that explore the vicious situation in the CHT. For 
the fear of the government and its military, researchers rarely talk about this ‘sensitive’ 
issue. There are incidents of rape, forced religious conversion and religious persecution, 
forced eviction, arrests, torture and kidnapping, and massacre in the CHT. Researchers 
and scholars, who focus on how military has committed gross violations of human rights 
in the region, mainly explore the incidents of massacre though only few of them mention 
about sexual violence against women. They have showed that since 1980 there have been
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more than dozen instances of massacre of the Adivasi people by the Bengali settlers and 
security personnel. In 1980 on March 25, a local Martial Law Commander opened fire on 
the gathering of Adivasi people at a Buddhist temple in Kaukhali-Kalamati, created a 
death toll of almost 300.1 In Barkal massacre on May 5, 1984 a total of 110 Adivasi 
people were killed and many women were raped and later shot dead. In Panchari, 
Matiranga and Comillatilla-Taindong massacres hundreds of Adivasi people were killed 
in 1986. On August 1988 in Hirachar, Sarbotail, Khagrachari, and Pablakhali, Adivasi 
people were killed and women were gang raped. In Longudu massacre, that happened on 
May 4, 1989 people were killed, house were burnt and Budhist temples were destroyed. 
In 1992 in Malya and Logang massacre hundreds of Adivasi people were killed and 
thousands of house were burnt. In Naniarchar, on November 11, 1993 and in Bandarban, 
on March 14, 1995 settlers and armies set fire on the houses of Adivasi people and killed 
hundreds people. In 2006 Mahalchari massacre settlers and armies attacked 10 Adivasi 
villages simultaneously. In the recent sporadic clashes between Bengalis and Adivasi 
people over two thousands of indigenous peoples have been made homeless, two 
Buddhist temples and one church have been burnt to ashes.2  
 When researchers have analyzed these incidences of massacres, they rarely have 
considered women’s distinctive vulnerability in these violent situations. Several 
researchers just have touched the issue of sexual violence without explaining its effect on 
women’s lives. Only the incidence of the abduction of Kalpana Chakma, a frontline 
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female activist in the struggle for establishing Adivashi people’s rights, got careful 
attention from researchers, scholars, journalists, human rights activists, and feminist 
organizations. As Kalpana was the Organizing Secretary of Hill Women’s Federation and 
a known figure among Bangladeshi activists, her abduction created a storm in whole 
Adivasi communities as well as in the world of activists, and social workers. But, 
Kalpana’s incident is not a separated case. Rather, there are thousands women in the CHT, 
who are suffering from sexual violence, forced abduction and there are thousands other 
who were killed. Adivasi women are facing violence not only from state, but also from 
their own communities, which remain unseen and unheard. Both the patriarchal state and 
Adivasi patriarchal societies try to submerge the sufferings of Adivasi women. By 
ignoring women’s experiences of violence researchers also participate in the practice that 
discriminate Adivasi women’s rights. 
Unseen Violence to Adivasi Women 
 Violence does not necessarily arise only from beyond the ethnic boundary. Rather, 
it exists within societies, and in home. According to Naher and Tripura,  
While growing number of indigenous women face discrimination and violence 
outside their homes in the countryside as well as in urban areas, they do not 
necessarily find safe havens in their own homes or communities. Instead, there 
too they may face an increasing trend of gender-based violence.3  
 
Indeed, domestic violence against women in Adivasi communities is not rare. KMKS’s 
case studies, an NGO based in Khagrachari, indicate that Adivasi women in the CHT 
encounter different forms of violence, ranging from physical abuse by husbands to rapes.4 
In most cases, the victims are not allowed to go to the court, nor do they have the means, 
                                                
3 Naher and Tripura, "Understanding Violence Against Indigenous Women in bangladesh," 5. 
 
4 Ibid., 7. 
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to seek justice. One of case shows that one 14 year old Chakma girl was raped by four 
Chakma men in a remote village of Rangamati in 2007 and local Adivasi leaders settled 
the matter in exchange for BDT 6,000, which rapists had to pay to the victim’s family.5  
Women’s suffering within their own communities as well as household remain 
invisible and unheard, as Adivasi women do not want to speaking about the violence that 
they encounter in their own home for protecting their communities and family ‘honor.’ 
Mainstream Bengali communities pose several stereotypical ideas about Adivasi 
communities, which includes that Adivasi people are responsible for their own suffering. 
This cultural prejudice of mainstream Bengali society fosters Adivasi women’s fear of 
ramifications on their families and communities and thereby motivates women to remain 
silent about their marginal positions in their own communities.  
 However, Adivasi men’s violence against women is not completely separated 
from broader violence caused by the state and its organizations at least for two reasons. 
Firstly, domestic violence against Adivasi women is partly the result of the anger and 
frustration of the Adivasi men who are dispossessed and oppressed by state.6 This fact is 
not only true for violent situation in the CHT, but also appropriate for several other 
vicious contexts where indigenous women are suffering both for their traditional 
patriarchal system and the state. Native American women in the United States of America 
are also suffering for domestic violence that is partly the outcome of state discrimination 
against Native American societies. Therefore, we can not speak about the domestic 
violence, traditional patriarchal systems, and indigenous women’s marginalization within 
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their own communities without emphasizing the characteristics of state as a hegemonic 
construct that influence and reinforce the behavior of those who engage in violent action 
against a perceived ‘other.’  
Secondly, the state is not merely a patriarchal institution, because in it the laws 
and customs for society are defined and controlled not only by men, but also by men 
from dominant groups to discriminate against not only women, but also all marginal 
people. Therefore, the Bangladeshi state not only influences domestic violence against 
Adivasi women, but also conducts violence against women from ethnic minority groups. 
Rather than ensuring Adivasi women’s security in conflict situation, state makes Adivasi 
women fall prey to violence such as rape, murder, kidnapping, religious conversion, and 
other forms of terrorism. Violence is usually executed by politically motivated settlers, 
security forces, a section of political and economic leaders, and government employees 
based in the CHT, who are aided, or at least shielded by the state apparatus that exclude 
non-Bengalis.7 
Sexual Violence Against Adivasi Women 
 In conflict situations women’s victimization by dominant group are shaped by the 
interplay of women’s ethnic and gender identities. Their rights are violated in two ways: 
as a member of dominant group’s ‘enemy’ and as a female member of the ‘enemy.’ But, 
why does a woman’s body becomes the central point for national politics, especially in 
ethnic conflict? One of the reasons behind this is the internalization and intensification of 
masculine ethos, with considering women as symbols of collective purity and honor.8 On 
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8 Naher and Tripura, "Understanding Violence Against Indigenous Women in bangladesh," 9. 
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the one hand, masculine characteristics of nationalism pave the platform for violating 
women’s rights because, “Nationalism typically has sprung from masculinized memory, 
masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope.”9 Therefore, the state appears as a 
gendered institution that allows limited power to women and little attention to women’s 
issues. On the other hand, the resonance of woman’s body in the national ideology as a 
symbol of honor, make women’s bodies a contested area upon which both the state and 
the minority ethnic groups fight against each other. Women’s bodies becomes the ground 
where the ideology of nationalism take material form and represents the success or failure 
of nation building.10  
This becomes evident in the conflict between Adivasi people and the Bangladeshi 
state, where rape has been used as an instrument of war against the purity and 
authenticity of Adivasi identity.11 According to Khisha, rapes of Adivasi women by 
Bengali security personnel in the early 1970 was one of the main reasons that made birth 
of Shanti Bahini, the armed wing of the PCJSS, that waged an armed struggle for the 
regional autonomy, inevitable.12 But, the armed insurgency of Adivasi soldiers resulted 
into many more incidents of rapes of Adivasi women by security forces. Therefore, 
Adivasi women constitute the most vulnerable section of population in the context of 
militarization in the CHT. Among the many crimes committed against the people of the 
Hill Tracts, sexual violence such as rape, gang rape, molestation, abduction and sexual 
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harassment are prevalent. In 1990, information from one refugee camp in India indicates 
that 1 in every 10 female has been a victim of rape in the CHT.13 As Mohsin notes, 
according to a report of the CHT Commission, “between 1991 and 1993 over 94 percent 
of the rape cases of the Hill women were by the security personnel. Over 40 percent of 
these women were under eighteen years of age.”14 It has been alleged that between 1998 
and 2008, approximately twenty Adivasi women have been raped and in 2009, there were 
more incidents of rape, sexual harassment and murder of Adivasi women, which included 
a thirteen year old Adivasi girl’s rape incident by a police officer.15 
Adivasi women not only encounter rape, but also they are face sexual and verbal 
harassment when they try to protect their male members of the family from state 
aggression. In a conflict situation, men are more likely to be suspected and picked up 
than women. Therefore, as Guhathakurta16 shows, Adivasi women often become 
reluctant to send their boys or husbands to the market places and decide to go to the 
market on their own. For going to the market they need a pass from security personnel, 
who verbally and physically abuse them. Even in the market places women are visibly 
harassed, often physically, mostly verbally both by security forces and Bengali settlers. 
Derogatory names which often one community used for another e.g. Chakku, for 
Chakmas. Moghs for Marmas etc. are used as verbal abuse by security personnel on the 
streets. Security personnel often searched buses coming in and going out of the hills. 
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Then Bengalis and Adivasis are separated and Adivasis especially are searched. Women 
Village Defense Police gave hill women a body search. But, though as women police 
personnel they do not sexually harass Adivasi women, but they often perform their duties 
in very rude manners that humiliate Adivasi women. 
Moreover, Adivasi women frequently encounter physical torture by army, for 
protecting their male members in the house, who are suspected as the spy or soldier of 
armed wings of PCJSS. For example, Kohima Dewan, one of the survivors of the 
physical violence caused by army said, 
I along with my daughter suffered torture at the hands of the Bangladesh 
military…..The military was looking for my husband and failing to find him 
arrested me and my daughter. They confined us and tortured us during two days 
of interrogation. They poured powder pepper into our eyes. Later my husband 
surrendered but they restricted our movements.17 
 
Security agencies use Adivasi women as a bait to attract the male members of the 
family. They know that Adivasi men will surrender to them, as communities’ and 
family’s honor are depended on women’s ‘honor.’ The symbolic role of collective honor 
assigned to Adivasi women by their communities makes them vulnerable in a conflict 
situation where dominant Bengali group devaluate Adivasi women by considering them 
as state’s ‘other.’ As Adivasi women are regarded as the biological bearers of their 
peoples and communities, the dominant groups systematically conduct sexual violence 
against them to damage their ‘enemy.’ Because, by abusing women sexually, settler 
Bengalis and security forces do not just violate women’s bodily rights, but also humiliate 
the identity of Adivasi people as a whole. This explains why rape and sexual violence 
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against women becomes an important instrument of Bangladeshi state’s aggression. 
However, women’s experiences of violence do not damage them only at the moment 
when violent occurs against them. Rather, there are severe effects of violence on Adivasi 
women that shape their lives. In the next section, I will focus on post-conflict 
vulnerabilities of Adivasi women. 
Post-violence Vulnerabilities of Adivasi Women 
  
 Compared to the conflict period, post conflict time is more unmanageable for 
Adivasi women, because their experiences of violence has changed their lives and 
relationships with their worlds. By failing to get justice, being alienated from the 
societies and their own bodies, going through psychological trauma, Adivasi women 
carry their experiences of violence in the rest of life.  
Bangladeshi state and law prove over history that justice is not for minority 
people, especially for women. Adivasi women, who have been suffering for sexual 
violence, are far away from the path of getting justice at least for three reasons. Firstly, 
the incidents of sexual violence against Adivasi women remain hidden both by the 
government and by the Adivasi communities. One the one hand, government imposes 
censorship on news of any violence against minority groups, and even when they are 
publicized, they hide more than they reveal.18 On the other hand, to avoid social 
humiliation, many victims of rape and their guardians often are reluctant to disclose the 
matter. Therefore, both the state and survivor’s family and community hide the incident 
of sexual violence and there by suppress the possibility for establishing justice. 
Secondly, Adivasi women do not get justice due to the lack of effective measures 
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taken by government officials, civil society, and human right organizations. There is no 
provision for providing compensation to the effected women of violence nor is their any 
mention of rehabilitation or counseling of victims of sexual violence in the Peace Accord. 
Sexual violence in wartime or in conflict situations has been normalized and therefore, 
policies that are aimed at preventing it or punishing rapists are viewed as unnecessary.19 
Indeed, the acts of human rights violations in the CHT by the security personnel enjoy 
exemption from criminal prosecution.20 Halim claims that the CHT Regional Council, 
local government administrative bodies never took any effective steps to redress the 
violence that is being committed against Adivasi women by security personnel and 
Bengali settlers.21 The incidents of abduction of Adivasi activist and central Organizing 
Secretary of Hill Women’s Federation –Kalpana Chakma – is a good example for state’s 
avoidance for taking proper step for rectifying the violent situation. Kalpana was 
abducted from her home on June 11, 1996 by Army Commander Lt. Ferdous. Ever since 
then the Hill Women’s Federation has been demanding investigation into the case and 
punishment for the culprits. As the Kalpana Chakma incident gained national and 
international media attention, the state tried to hide its violence against Kalpana by 
offering several narratives of her disappearance. According to Karim, 
One version claimed that Kalpana had eloped with a Shanti Bahini (Armed wings 
of PCJSS) freedom fighter because her family was opposed to her marriage to 
him and she was now happily living in the Tripura district of India. Almost a 
month and a half after her disappearance, the 24th Infantry Division, the 
occupying military unit in the CHT, released a press statement in which they 
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claimed that Kalpana was closely aligned with the Shanti Bahini and had willing 
left her home to go in hiding to embarrass the army. It was never made clear in 
the report how the military had verified this information. A third version claimed 
that Kalpana had been kidnapped by Shanti Bahini men with the help of Indian 
agents and was being held against her will in India in an attempt to destabilize the 
political situation within Bangladesh. None of these claims or counter-claims 
were ever proven.22 
 
The abduction incident of Kalpana is neither an isolated event nor an unusual occurrence 
in the CHT. This incident is just one example among thousands in a long history of 
violence of state towards its ethnic and religious minorities, which demonstrate the state’s 
inactivity in regard to establishing justice.  
 Thirdly, local communities and political parties also hinder Adivasi women from 
getting justice, especially in the case when Adivasi men committed violence against 
women. The report of KMKS, a NGO based in Khagrachari, claim, 
In the CHT, conflicts between indigenous (Adivasi) persons, including disputes 
involving women, are arbitrated by members of UPDF or JSS. Nobody is allowed 
to go to the courts. In particular, they are the ones who settle cases involving 
violence against women, and local people are forced to accept their verdicts.23  
  
Therefore, Adivasi leaders’ stance shows that like the state they also violate women’s 
rights and retain male control over women. The Adivasi local male leaders do not 
consider women’s issues in their agendas. In terms of dealing with the rape and other 
incidences of human rights violation committed against women, Shantu Larma, the 
president of PCJSS, emphasized on the need to exercise “political autonomy” by all the 
concerned CHT bodies. Among the political groups, it seems that the PCJSS and UPDF 
have been unable to effectively address the issue of violence and rape against the 
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indigenous women. Occasionally, some assistance has been rendered by JSS and UPDF 
to victims of violence against women, but that is not institutional support.24 
 Not only does the community fail to provide justice, but also Adivasi women, 
who are the victims of sexual violence, often suffer most for the alienation from their 
own society and family. For avoiding social humiliation, very often victim’s family 
decides to send woman any other place far from the CHT or the victim has to reduce her 
social mobility. Victims are also forced to leave their homeland and their family by the 
perpetrators. One of the rape victims named Rupali Chakma, a 26 years old woman, 
described her alienation from her society and nature, 
I have lost everything, there is nothing more to loose . . . I have already moved 
out from Rangamati (a district of the CHT) and now living in Bagerhut . . . Now 
fear remains an unpleasant part of my life . . . Closed narrow places became quite 
a threat for me. I had always loved walking in the forests. It could be said that 
forest was my life but it has now become like an enemy.25  
 
Rupali’s statement reveals that rape and sexual violence not only displaced women but 
also restricted their movement and action. Rape disconnected women from their own 
homes, own people and placed them into an unknown locality. As a result, women 
becomes rootless, choose an isolated life, and being worried about their own security, 
they try to cope with a new, more marginalized social space, which ostracized them from 
their traditional networks. Often fear of being sexually abused forces women to give up 
their cultural identity. Many women, both who are abused and who are not, now are 
scared to wear their traditional dress as it makes them more vulnerable and increase the 
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likelihood of sexual assault by military personnel and settlers.26   
Financial crisis also adds insecurity in their lives. Very often raped women loose 
their jobs, especially, if people come to know about the incident. This was happened with 
Nilima, a 22 years old Adivasi woman who worked in garments factory.27 Nilima was 
raped by some Bengalis in Chittagong on August 11, 2005. When the news broke out, she 
was sacked from her job immediately and landed in a serious economic crisis. Her family 
members could not cope with this stress and they left her. Her own relatives also refused 
to stay with her. Being alienated from her family and fall in a financial crisis, she became 
a sex worker.  
 Survivors of sexual violence face not only the physical impact of violence, but 
also encounter psychological trauma in the rest of their lives. Being frustrated by failing 
to get justice of the violence that they encounter and being alienated from their social 
network, Adivasi women who are the victims of sexual violence often suffered 
psychological trauma. Women’s lives become full of silence. They cannot speak for 
justice for their and their family member’s security, even if they speak there is no one to 
listen their words. Being left by their close ones, they suddenly find themselves as 
worthless members in the family. Consequently, they start to hate themselves, blame 
themselves. Therefore, Rupali blames herself for the assault every single day, as she said, 
“Today I am carrying a disgraceful life; the reason is that I am a woman.” 28  She felt her 
body no longer belonged to her; rather, according to her, it belonged to any unknown 
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person. Her body became the marker of pain and turned into a lifeless object. The victims 
of rape often encounter loss of self-esteem, and loss of sexual desire. They have suicidal 
tendency for losing their dignity and both Rupali and Nilima fear that one day they willa 
kill themselves. Several times, victims just forget to trust any other men. As Nilima 
pointed out, “I had a boyfriend. He loved me a lot. Now I will never get married  . . . I 
cannot trust man now. For me all men are the same.”29 So, Rupali and Nilima’s 
experiences tell us that a raped woman incorporates self-destructive behaviors. Constant 
fear, humiliation and serious restrictions shape their everyday lives and relationships with 
other and it is difficult for them to ever fully recover. 
 Very often victims of sexual violence fail to attend school, which affected their 
studies. Because of the psychological trauma, many raped girls are afraid to come in front 
of strangers, especially Bengalis. Therefore, their participation in school often decrease 
and their studies are affected. One of the respondents of Mohsin from Marma ethnic 
community, named Muima Marma, who was raped when she was only 14 years old and a 
student of class eight, described her experiences: 
I lost three years in studies and everything else after that. I failed to concentrate 
on anything because I had nightmares even at daytime. I used to get frightened if 
someone came from behind me, especially if it was a man. I cannot forget the 
past, forget what I lost.30  
 
Several times victims families also restricted their attendance at school for their security. 
This has a long-term effect on their life. Being withdrawn from the school, they loose 
their friends, their “normal” childhood, and most importantly their future is ruined.    
Therefore, it is clear that Adivasi women fall prey to sexual violence as well as 
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post violence crisis. Some researchers have mentioned about sexual violence against 
Adivasi women, in their works on violence against Adivasi people. But, most of the time 
they have equated women’s vulnerabilities with community’s susceptibilities and have 
failed to address the complexities of Adivasi women’s suffering in post-conflict periods. 
However, the socio-psychological impact of torture, molestation, abuse and rape on the 
Adivasi women cannot be ignored. The effects and trauma are not always immediately 
visible. But, it does not reduce the severity of trauma in the post-conflict period. Rather, 
there are long-term implications for the individual and society at large, which are difficult 
to calculate. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
INVISIBLE ACTORS IN POLITICS OF NATIONALISM 
   
Nationalism by being biased towards the majority/dominant community (and) 
alienates the subordinate/minority communities, which subsequently leads the 
later to demand for separate nationhood.1 
 
The above statement describes nationalisms that have been emerged in South Asia in 
post-colonial periods.  Nationalisms in South Asia, therefore, become the rhetoric of 
dominant group’s narratives. However, as nationalism is gendered and sprung from 
masculinized hope, South Asian nationalisms become the narratives of the triumphs of 
national male figures. Women’s questions in the agenda of nationalism and women’s 
roles in nation building have been always ignored by male leaders. This chapter will 
explore the dominant narratives of nationalism and show how Adivasi people and women 
are excluded from these narratives. 
Rhetoric of Nationalism 
 
Mainstream researches on politics of nationalism in Bangladesh focus on the rise 
and fall of nationalisms and analyze the politics by describing the acts of male leaders. 
Researchers show that British colonialism marked the beginning of the alienation of the 
Adivasi people from mainstream political actions of nationalisms. Colonial rulers 
segregated the CHT from the Bengalis to remove the region from the turbulence of the 
anti- British nationalist movements in the Indian subcontinent. Therefore as Mohsin
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claims, neither the Muslim League, which was dominant in the areas on account of its 
Muslim majority population, nor the Indian National Congress, made any attempts to 
incorporate the people of CHT in their nationalist agendas.  After gaining independence, 
political unity constituted the basis of Pakistani nationhood based on cultural unity or 
forced assimilation of the entire population.2 Mohsin shows that in the new state the West 
Pakistani political elite used their model of nationhood for the whole state. This politics 
of nationalism alienated the Bengalis and gave birth to Bengali nationalism. The Adivasi 
people of CHT, despite being territorially a part of East Pakistan, remained alienated 
from Bengali nationalism; as again the political unity of the population of East Pakistan 
was being sought by emphasizing Bengali language and culture. This becomes evident in 
independent Bangladesh too. 
In sovereign Bangladesh different kinds of nationalisms arose in different 
trajectories of history. At different points of time the Bengali political elite adopted, 
manipulated and emphasized different elements of nationalism. But, the common 
interests of these nationalisms have remained same, which is to consolidate Muslim 
Bengali’s dominance over minority ethnic groups. Mohsin claims, 
In the Bengali secular model of nationhood, language and culture were the main 
tools in the hand of Awami League (AL party) . . . In the post-Awami League 
period, the political\military elite that assumed power discarded the secular 
Bengali model of nationhood in favor of the Bangladeshi model. This model had 
two variants. During the Zia regime (1975-1981) the Bangladeshi model of 
nationhood emphasized upon religion in the form of Islam, and Bengali language 
and culture. Ershad regime (1982-1990) de-emphasized the linguistic and cultural 
elements of this model and tried to give wholly Islamic orientation to it. 
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In Mujib regime, AL political leaders demanded that Adivasi people should identify 
themselves as Bengalis. Even in an electoral speech at Rangamati in 1973 Mujib 
declared, “From this day onward the tribal are being promoted into Bengalis,” which 
implied that Bengalis were at a higher echelon of civilization than Adivasi people.3 On 
the other hand, though in the Zia and Ershad regimes there were no quests to turn the 
Adivasi people into Bengalis, but they alienated not only Adivasi people, but also non-
Muslim Bengali groups from the model of “Bangladeshi” nationhood by emphasizing an 
Islamic identity over a cultural one. In this process Adivasi people have been alienated, as 
both Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalisms have not created any space for them. This 
attitude has helped to crystalize the sense of nationhood among Adivasi people. 
 Mujib’ refusal to recognize Adivasi people as distinct community from Bengalis, 
Adivasi people’s absence in the narratives of Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalisms, and 
the persecution in the CHT had led to the demand by PCJSS, for a separate nationhood –
Jumma nation –for Adivasi people. The word Jumma has its origins in Jhum, which has 
been the traditional mode of cultivation of the Adivasi people in CHT. PCJSS invoked 
this particular nomenclature to infuse Adivasi people with a sense of pride in their past, 
traditional system and value.4 Also, PCJSS created this Jumma nationalism for separating 
Adivasi people from Bengalis and submerging the inherent differences between Adivasi 
communities.  
 However, like Pakistani, Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalism, Jumma 
nationalism also has created on the basis of dominant groups –the Chakma ethnic group’s 
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–ideology of “nation” that submerged other minority Adivasi groups. Jumma nationalism 
does not represent thirteen different ethnic groups in the CHT, who lack the common 
sociocultural denominators, such as, common language, religion, culture, social norms, 
customs, and history. Even several of these ethnic communities have hostile relationships 
with each other. Jumma is a Chakma word, it emphasizes Chakma culture. Moreover, as 
PCJSS is overwhelmingly a Chakma dominated institution, there exists the real fear of 
Chakma hegemony in this construction of Jumma nationalism itself.5 
 Therefore, it is evident from the above analyses that nationalism always biased 
towards powerful groups. Researchers have explored this truth in different works. 
However, most of the time they have failed to see that women’s issues are not included in 
the agenda of nationalism and women activists do not have any space in the politics of 
nationalism. As, nationalism by nature is gender biased; it ignores women’s rights and 
avoids women’s roles in national politics. Though it is true that the presidents of two 
main parties in Bangladesh are women they just carry on the legacy of Mujib and Zia. 
One of them is Seikh Hasina who is the only living child of Mujibur Rahman, the other 
one is Khaleda Zia, who is the widow of Ziaur Rahman. Both of them were elected only 
because of their father or husband’s political influences. For Bengalis either Mujib or Zia 
is the father of nation. In the imagination of Bengalis there is no “mother” for the nation. 
These two women are considered by Bengalis only as the implementers of Mujib or Zia’s 
policies. In a same way, among Adivasi people Manabendra Larma is the father of 
Jumma nation. There are thousands of Adivasi women who are directly related with the 
political struggles of Adivasi people. But, they remain unseen in the rhetoric of Bengali, 
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Bangladeshi as well as Jumma nationalism. They are invisible in the works of scholars, 
who see nation and its politics from male point of view.  
Adivasi Women’s Invisibility in the Politics of Nationalism 
 
 The invisibility of Adivasi women in the politics of nationalism and avoidance of 
their agendas in the narratives of nationalism are not an accident. Rather, both 
government and local Adivasi political parties and communities create this invisibility. 
But, what is the reason behind this? To explain why women’s questions and women’s 
appearance had remained apparently unimportant in the anti-colonial nationalist agenda 
in India in nineteenth century, Chatterjee claims that women’s issues did not overtake by 
the more pressing and emotive issues of political struggle.6 Rather, nationalism did in fact 
provide an answer to women’s issues.  He said, 
The reason lies in nationalism’s (Indian nationalism) success in situating the 
“women’s questions” in an inner domain of sovereignty, far removed from the 
arena of political contest with the colonial state. The inner domain of national 
culture was constituted in the light of the discovery of “tradition”. 
 
Though Chatterjee’s point is appropriate for analyzing women’s invisibility in the 
political arena in colonial and immediate post-colonial contexts it cannot fully explain the 
situation of Adivasi women in the context of Jumma nationalism. The growth of Jumma 
nationalism within the state of Bangladesh was a consequence of the imposition of 
Bengali or Bangladeshi model of nationhood upon the entire Adivasi population. 
Therefore, for establishing themselves as a separate nationhood from Bengalis, Adivasi 
leaders demanded for Jumma nationalism that requires women as well as men to secure 
their traditional domain and identity. Like Indian nationalism the interest of Jumma 
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nationalism was not to establish independent nation-state. Rather, the immediate aims of 
Jumma nationalism were gaining the recognition as a separate “nation” from Bengalis 
depending on its traditional culture and establish autonomous especial regional power in 
the CHT. To do this, nationalist Adivasi leaders have ignored Adivasi women’s agenda 
by emphasizing Jumma nation’s problems over women’s distinctive problems. Moreover, 
to establish themselves in highest political power position in the CHT, male Adivasi 
leaders have submerged the contributions of women’s activists in the political struggle.  
Therefore, on the one hand, both the government and Adivasi local leader 
overlooked Adivasi women’s questions. Government has created National Women’s 
Development Policy, where there is no mention about the distinctive problems of Adivasi 
women. Moreover, the Peace Accord, that was signed by the government and PCJSS, 
also has failed to secure Adivasi women’s rights. The Accord has not done anything yet 
for increasing Adivasi women’s participation in the regional politics. The Accord makes 
no provisions for the overall rights of women. A specific case is Adivasi women’s right 
to land. In addition, this Accord has made no provision for the rehabilitation of the rape 
victims or domestic violence victims. The PCJSS has remained silent on these issues; 
even several times they have denied the importance of women’s issues. Therefore, we see 
Shantu Larma, the leader of the PCJSS to say, “I do not believe in women empowerment, 
once the nation is empowered women would automatically be empowered.” Moreover, 
like the local political party, several Adivasi organizations also have ignored women’s 
issues in their agenda. Kalpana, who was a well known activist and central Organizing 
Secretary of Hill Women’s Federation, critiqued the Students council for overlooking 
women’s problems. She claimed, 
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Despite the fact that women constitute half the population, they are not taken 
seriously in any movement for social change. As an example one can point out 
that the numerous demands voiced during the current movement, even the 10 
point demand of the “Chhatra Shongram Porishod” (Students Revolutionary 
Council), do not specifically speak of problems faced by a woman! Many 
conscious men seem to think that such problems are not important enough to be 
dealt with at this hour. Therefore, the issues of women’s emancipation have 
remained neglected in the agenda for class struggle and political change.7 
 
This evidence shows that the woman question remains subsumed under the national 
question, not only by the state, but also by the local Adivasi male leaders as well as 
Adivasi organizations. 
  The government and Adivasi political party have not only ignored Adivasi 
women’s questions but also they have tried to hide Adivasi women’s contribution in the 
political struggles. According to Mohsin8, the government decided that there would be 
reserved seats for women members in the Regional Council. However, among the 25 
seats, 12 were male (Adivasi) and two female (Adivasi) and among the non-Adivasi six 
were male and one female. This reflects gender imbalance and male hegemony and 
disregards Adivasi women’s sacrifices and participation in the political activities. The 
local Adivasi political party does not object to the government’s decision; rather, it agrees. 
As there are thirteen ethnic communities among the Adivasi society, there are hidden 
contests among male leaders for the local political power. Therefore, for securing their 
power in the local political positions, Adivasi male leaders, who are considered as the 
“real” representative of the ethnic community, try to impede women leaders and activists’ 
involvement in the political sphere. Therefore, Larma mentioned in his interview that he 
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is not in favor of increasing the number of reserved women seats in the RC.9 Moreover, 
inherent male biases in the organizations also obstruct women from their active and equal 
participation in politics. Kalpana Chakma claimed in her diary that there are male 
members, who do not respect other female members with the organization and dominate 
most of the organizations.10 She also claimed that overall Adivasi patriarchal society tries 
to hinder women’s participation in the political sphere. She said, 
Our social structure is such that if women start to become aware, everyone feels 
threatened. The minute she tries to break her chains, people call her immodest. 
When she participates in the movement, people say she is without character.11 
  
Moreover, the absence of financial help from Adivasi society and political party hinders 
Adivasi women to politically mobilize any movements, or to participate in the democratic 
processes in a substantive manner. Therefore, Adivasi women are still in the process of 
defining for themselves a space of their own both within their organizations as well as 
within their societies.  
Despite all of the socio-political hindrance that Adivasi women are facing, they 
are fighting for establishing their own as well as communities’ rights. Women from 
different background have been drawn together by the common bond of resistance 
against the repressive forces of both Bangladeshi state and Adivasi patriarchal societies. 
However, women’s agency, activism and political struggles remain unseen in both 
academic arena as well as political field. 
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Rising from Ashes: Unseen Activisms of Adivasi Women 
 By focusing too much on the victimization of women, the literature on women’s 
marginalization commits further injustice to women by casting them merely in passive 
role. Feminist researchers now no longer confine themselves to documenting and 
analyzing instances of women’s “oppressed” and “subordinate” conditions. Naher and 
Tripura claim that rather than representing women in a passive role, many researchers 
today highlights how women can be seen to exercise power in their own lives.12 
However, most of the researches on the CHT conflict situation have ignored Adivasi 
women’s agency and activism. In this section, my aim is to highlight the ways in which 
Adivasi women act as active agents of history.  
 Adivasi women started to participate in the political struggle through the Adivasi 
women’s organization named “Parbatyo Chattagram Mohila Samity” (CHT Women 
Society), which was the first Adivasi women organization. According to Halim,  
On 21 February 1975, the “Parbatyo Chattagram Mohila Samity” (CHT Women 
Society) was formed. This was then part of the Central Committee of the JSS. 
During that period each village had a branch of this Mohila Samity, which was 
known as “Mohila Panchayet”. The task of this Samity was basically to raise 
awareness among the women, provide ideas about the struggle, organize political 
schooling, inspire women on how to contribute in the struggle or provide psycho-
moral support as women and so on.13 
 
Apart from this, the members of CHT Women Society played very important role in the 
struggle during the insurgency period. The women extended their active support and 
cooperation especially in terms of disseminating information and carrying letters and 
other secret documents for the fighters. They worked and risked their lives as informants, 
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and got molested, abused and raped by the military. Even thirty five  members of this 
organization participated in the military training for securing their communities from the 
aggression of Bangladeshi state.14 Among those members at least two members –
Madhabilata Chakma and Mithila Chakma –have fought besides their peers, who were in 
Shantibahini, the armed wings of PCJSS.  
Apart from participating in armed war between Bengalis and Adivasis, these 
women have taken several steps for the wellbeing of their communities. To establish 
Adivasi women as economically independent, Madhabilata created one of the biggest 
Adivasi textile societies in the CHT, which is known nationally. Moreover, she is 
struggling to establish Adivasi women’s empowerment and their inheritance rights. Now, 
she is a member of the Executive Committee of the PCJSS and a regional representative 
of Durbar network, a national network that has created a platform for women from 
different backgrounds to work together.15 
The other member of the CHT women’s Society Mithila Chakma has fought in 
political field by fostering cultural movement. As a dancer Mithila emphasized the 
cultural aspect in the student’s front. According to Guhathakurta, 
She (Mithila) felt that if Adivasi were to have a different identity from Bengalis, 
then they must demonstrate it in their culture. So she started to learn the dances of 
all the indigenous people by staying with them and then taught these dances to a 
group of women. In this way a cultural troupe of the students’ wing was formed 
by the name of “Giri Shur” (music of the hills) . . . Later they were asked to 
perform in the victory day celebrations in Dhaka. Mithila claimed that because of 
her endeavor the Government of Bangladesh was forced to recognize cultural 
differences and later appropriated it into state practice by setting up a tribal 
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cultural center, which was set up in Rangamati.16 
 
 Besides the CHT Women Society, there are other women organizations, where 
Adivasi women activists participate actively. Among them Hill Women’s Federation 
(HWF) is the most organized and strongest organization that is raising its voice against 
all kind of women’s oppression caused by both the state and the local patriarchal society. 
Hill Women’s Federation was formed in 1989, which came into effect around 1991. 
According to Guhathakurta, the issue of rape and harassment against women by security 
personnel was the single most important factor behind the formation of Hill Women’s 
federation.17 She claimed that the strength of the HWF lies in the effectiveness of their 
local branches that are situated in every sub-districts and universities. During the conflict 
period the women activists of HWF have openly agitated against army rule and 
oppressive measures followed by the state. They have organized rallies and 
demonstrations against the genocide of the Adivasi people through posters, leaflets and 
other media, such as art and songs. They have brought up the gender issue along with the 
rights of indigenous people. Several members of HWF participated in international 
forums where they drew special attention to the distinctive problems faced by Adivasi 
women in the CHT. It is the fact that several times their leaderships has been subsumed 
under male-dominated leaderships. However, these women members of the HWF never 
stopped but, continue their activism, even sometimes more efficiently than their male 
colleagues. The militant role that women often played in their communities perhaps best 
exemplified by the bravery displayed by their ex-Organizing Secretary Kalpana Chakma. 
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Kalpana Chakma was the first activist, who explored vividly the internal 
oppression of Adivasi women caused by both government and Adivasi patriarchal 
society. In her diary, which was recovered by few journalists from her home after her 
abduction, she claimed, 
On the one hand, (the woman faces) the steam roller of rape, torture, sexual 
harassment, humiliation and helplessness inflicted by the military and Bengalis, 
and on the other hand, she faces the curse of social and sexual discrimination.18 
 
In expressing her yearnings for freedom from oppression she used a magnificent 
metaphor, 
When a caged bird wants to be free, does it mean that she wants freedom for 
herself alone? . . . I think it is natural to expect the caged bird to be angry at those 
who imprisoned her. But, if she understands that she has been imprisoned and that 
the cage is not her rightful place, then she has every right to claim the freedom of 
the skies!19 
 
Kalpana not only believed in women’s freedom, but also urged freedom for all 
Bangladeshi citizens from all kinds of oppression. She dreamed for a society where all 
men and women would be able to share equal status in society and where there would be 
no dominant community and class group.20 She struggled for self-determination of the 
Adivasi people and stressed the need for the Adivasi youth to shake off the dominant 
social systems, which has descended on them. For her, democracy did not mean free and 
fair elections. It meant equal participation of all members of ethnic, class and gender 
                                                
18 Chakma, "Kalpana Chakmar Chithipatra (The Letters of Kalpana Chakma)." 
 
19 Ibid., 20. 
 
20 Ibid., 53. 
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group in the political process.21 Her voice rang against all kind of gendered and ethnic 
violence towards Adivasi women as well as Adivasi people and communities. She was 
abducted (also probably killed) by Army commander precisely because she was present 
in all movements and demonstration against the oppressor. 
 Although the fate of Kalpana Chakma still remains unknown to the public, she 
left behind a powerful legacy that other Adivasi women would embrace. She represented 
a new generation of Adivasi women activists who not only speak up against injustices 
committed by organized forces of state, but also take a stance against gender inequality 
within their own communities. However, several of these new generation activists are not 
only fighting in the battlefield, but also fostering cultural movement against dominant 
power structures. One of the indicators of this is evident in many of the protest songs and 
poetry written by Adivasi women activists. 
 One of them is well-known poet and activist Kabita Chakma, who raises her voice 
against state oppression. Her famous poem “Joli no Udhim Kittei,” –Why Shall I not 
Resist –tell us the state led ethnic violence towards Adivasi people and people’s 
resistance against the violence. The poem was originally written in Chakma language and 
then it was translated by Kamal, 
 Why mustn’t I flare up? 
 You go on doing whatever you please – 
 force me to abandon my home, 
 turn dense forests into deserts, 
 morning into evening, 
 the fertile into infertile. 
  
Why mustn’t I flare up? 
 You go on doing whatever you please – 
 force me to be an alien in my own birth land 
                                                
21 Guhathakurta, "Women's Survival and Resistances," 91. 
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 turn women into slaves, 
 eyesight into blindness, 
 creation into a halt. 
 
 I am enraged by neglect and humiliation, 
 Blood gushes tumultuously through my veins, 
 Repeated strikes will bring down the obstacles, 
 Sharpened by fresh awareness. 
 
 I alone can bring me fulfillment, 
 why mustn’t I flare up?22    
 
Women activists in the CHT also have written down many protest songs and poems 
against their traditional patriarchal societies. They are not shy about raising 
uncomfortable questions about their own communities. This becomes evident in the 
poems of Lipika Tripura, who wrote: 
 When I pass by this woman’s house, I hear her crying. 
 They are poor, and her husband is addicted to alcohol. 
 Her father-in-law is lame, and the mother-in-law blind. 
 She puts up with all hardships silently, yet she gets all the blame. 
 Her in-laws blame her for not being able to cheek his addiction. 
 But if she asks her husband to refrain from drinking, he gets angry. 
 He beats her up if he cannot get his drink even for a day. 
 My question to her in-laws: “What is the fault of the woman?”23 
 
 Besides these women activists, general Adivasi women also exercise power, 
though in limited sphere, in shaping their own lives through their various strategies of 
resistances and negotiations. By doing their daily chores, looking for food, going to the 
market, Adivasi women strategically negotiate with the traditional family values as well 
as threats posed by state’s organizations and settler Bengalis. One of the main strategies 
is to stay together and help each other in the crisis periods. In the absence of male 
                                                
22 Kabita Chakma, Why Mustn't I Flare Up? , trans. Sajed Kamal (Dhaka: Narigrantha Prabartana, 2002). 5. 
 
23 Lipika Tripura, "Hamjwk," Hill Waves: A Quarterly Literary Magazine of the CHT 1997, 35. 
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members of the family, Adivasi women often protect each other’s household and guard 
their house by rotation. They cook food together and take care of each other’s children in 
the absence of children’s parents. They learn this strategy from their childhood. One of 
the research participants of Guhathakurta, named Meki Chakma, informed that when they 
were children they were used to act as look out posts for their families and neighbors.24 
When they saw the army coming, they would run to their families or neighbors, to be on 
alert or to flee and hide. Children also used to help each other when they would go to 
school to avoid sexual harassment by the army. Sheila, a Chakma girl, told Guhathakurta 
that girls and boys used to gather at one spot in the village for defending themselves from 
possible harassment by the army.25 They tried as far as possible to keep away from the 
main road in order to avoid military.  
 Therefore, it is evident from the above analyses and examples of women’s 
activism that Adivasi women are not mere passive victims. Rather, they have fought in 
the battlefield with Shantibahini comrade; they are now participating in the political 
struggle for self-determination of Adivasi people, fostering cultural movement and 
resisting the dominant patriarchal societies as well as state power in their daily lives. 
These women are courageous, as it is not safe for women to resist against oppressors, 
especially, living in a militarized conflict zone, where their lives are in constant threat, it 
has never been easy for Adivasi women to actively participate in their political struggles. 
However, no threat, no violence has been able to stop them. They remain in the field with 
their courage to continue their war for establishing their rights as nation, as women.  
                                                
24 Guhathakurta, "Women's Survival and Resistances," 80. 
 
25 Ibid., 81. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 
 
 There are debates about the solution of the CHT political situation between 
political leaders, Adivasi activists, Human rights activist, feminist and civil society. Most 
of them agree that the successful implementation of the Peace Accord will establish 
“peace” in the region. However, as the Accord itself is a gendered treaty and biased 
towards the dominant Bengali group, implementation of the Accord cannot be the final 
answer for ending the conflict situation in the CHT. Some of the critical scholars, and 
activists, like Mohsin and Guhathakurta, believe that to establish real peace in the CHT, it 
is necessary to democratize the constitution, confirm political representation of all groups, 
decentralize the government, sensitize the media, raise awareness among Bengalis and 
Adivasi, establish transparency of the military, ensure people’s security, and empower 
women for building peace. I agree with the second group’s demands, for democracy and 
the equal rights of all citizens. But, these demands are not new. Rather, this group has 
been urging Adivasi people’s rights for decades. Unfortunately, the government remains 
silent on these demands. The reason behind this lies in the fact that Adivasi people and 
their Bengali companions have failed to establish solidarity in broader national and 
transnational contexts to enhance their movement against Bangladeshi state’s oppression. 
I believe that to bring positive social change in the lives of Adivasi people, local 
resistances will not be enough. Rather, by establishing solidarity, that will transcend the 
nation states’ boundaries as well as the divisions of race, class, ethnicity, gender we can
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end the ethnic conflict and hatred between Adivasis and Bengalis. This chapter will 
explore the problems behind establishing empathy surrounding on the issue of Adivasi 
people’s rights and the possible pathways for building solidarity both in national and 
transnational levels. 
Problems for Establishing Solidarity 
  
There are at least four reasons behind the failure of establishing solidarity within 
Adivasi communities as well as between Adivasi, Bengali and transnational communities. 
Firstly, as I mentioned earlier that there are thirteen different ethnic Adivasi groups living 
in the CHT, who do not share common sociocultural components, such as, common 
language, religion, culture, social norms, customs, and history. Several of these ethnic 
communities have hostile relationships with each other. Though Adivasi political group 
has tried to bring all Adivasi people in the CHT under the umbrella of Jumma nation 
based on their shared experiences of deprivation and exploitation the rhetoric of Jumma 
nation has failed to address the fact that Adivasi people are not only exploited by the state 
but also by the dominant Adivasi ethnic group. The leaders from the Chakma Adivasi 
group, second to Bangladeshi government, make the major socio-political decision in the 
CHT. In the local politics Chakma are more visible than other Adivasi group, which 
becomes evident in the composition of the regional council and PCJSS. The presence of 
Chakma hegemony in the Adivasi sociopolitical sectors has shaped Adivasi people’ 
movements against the state oppression, that often failed to bring Adivasi people from all 
ethnic backgrounds into a common platform by failing to address those minority 
communities’ interests. The intra and inter-ethnic class differentiations also intensify the 
obstacles towards building solidarity surrounding Adivasi people’s rights in the CHT. 
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Class differentiations destroy the possibility of establishing empathy between different 
groups through out the history. It is the evident within the black communities in the 
United States of America where class interest has destroyed the earlier community bonds 
and sisterhood among African American women.1 Same thing is happened in the CHT. 
There is a rising middle class Adivasi group who works in the international organizations 
situated in the CHT. These international organizations, which claim that they are trying to 
“develop” the region, ignore those issues that are responsible for the political conflicting 
situation in the CHT. As the employees of these organizations the emergent middle class 
group also tries to apart themselves from political activity to secure their own privilege 
and the resources that they gain from involvement with these international organizations. 
Therefore, this middle class group is securing their class interests at the cost of the 
possibility of establishing solidarity with other Adivasi people from the marginal class.  
Secondly, the social movement for Adivasi people’s rights has failed to include 
the agendas of Adivasi people and religious minorities from the area of the plains in their 
political demands. On the one hand, there are plains-living Adivasi people, who are 
struggling for the recognition of their rights over their lands that have left out from the 
political demands of Adivasi people in the CHT. On the other hand, religious minorities, 
Bengali Hindu and Christian groups, who experiences the second class citizen status of 
the country against the majority Muslims, also have been left out of the CHT Adivasi 
people’s agenda. By ignoring the minority people’s interests, Adivasi people in Hill 
Tracts fail to establish broader solidarity among marginal groups for bringing about 
positive social change in Bangladesh. 
                                                
1 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Conciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment  (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
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Thirdly, Adivasi people’s movement has not built solidarity within a broader 
national context and as a result, has not gained attention from all over Bangladesh. There 
are many reasons behind this. Most of the citizens of Bangladesh know almost nothing 
about Adivasi people in the CHT and they feel they are not related with Adivasi people’s 
problems. Some are hostile towards minority people. A significant part of Bengalis’ 
mindsets are determined by dominant ideology to discriminate and “rule” others with 
some “concession.”2 Most of the journalists, human rights activists, researchers, NGO 
and members of the civil society belongs to this last group. The Bengali middle-class led 
organizations fails to engage with the questions of ethnicity and more seriously 
nationality. This becomes evident in several activities of NGO workers, Human rights 
and feminist activists.  
Most of the NGOs hesitate to deal with national political issues. For example, we 
can look back the incidents in the Beijing conference. Although the National Preparatory 
Committee Towards Beijing, NGO Forum ’95 constituted a separate task force on 
indigenous women, barely two lines were included on the topic in the summary of the 
official NGO report.3 Women’s organizations also follow the same path of NGOs. 
Guhathakurta explains, 
After the CHT accord has been signed, while celebrating 8th march, International 
Woman’s Day, the same Sammalita Nari Shomaj (Society of Collective Women) 
which has campaigned actively for Kalpana Chakma, turned on a group of 
indigenous women representing the Hill Women’s Federation who had brought 
with them a banner saying that their struggle shall stop only with autonomy! The 
                                                
2 Anu Muhammad, "The Case of National Minorities," in Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong Hill Tracts 
in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism, ed. Naeem Mohaiemen (Dhaka: Drishtipat Writers' 
Collective, 2010), 22. 
 
3 Meghna Guhathakurta, "Resistance Politics in the Hills," in Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong Hill 
Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism, ed. Naeem Mohaiemen (Dhaka Drishtipat Writers' 
Collective, 2010), 84. 
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organizers of Shammilito Nari Shomaj asked the HWF members to put down their 
banner, as the slogan was “too political”!4  
 
This shows that Sammalita Nari Shomaj had railed their support for Kalpana issue 
on the basis of a very abstract construction of human rights. Like them most of the 
feminist and human rights organizations involved with the demands of Adivasi people, 
who separate gender discrimination from the larger intersections of ethnic, class 
marginalization. Karim found out from her conversations with some feminist activists 
that those feminists could not support the territorial autonomy of Adivasi people, since 
the constitution guarantees the right to all Bengalis to move and settle freely anywhere in 
the state.5 In another group discussion with feminists in Dhaka, Karim found out that 
some feminists believed that Adivasis do not face any discrimination in Bangladesh 
because racism is a European invention. Though a few feminists challenge their peer’s 
ideas but most of them remain “obedient” to their nationalist hegemony. Karim’s 
conclusions provide some explanation of this, 
It was immediately pointed out by a leading feminist and human rights activist 
that if racism did not exist how do we account for the differential response of the 
Bengali feminist community to the rape and murder of Yasmin (a young Bengali 
teenager who was brutally raped and murdered by the police in 1995; her murder 
was taken up by the feminist organizations in the country as yet another instance 
of the gendered violence of the state vs. that of the alleged abduction of Kalpana.) 
The response to Yasmin's rape and murder galvanized many more Bengali women 
than did the disappearance of Kalpana Chakma. The speaker's point was that there 
was more identification with Yasmin because she was one of 'our' own, whereas 
Kalpana could be easily othered as an Adivasi woman and/or as a Shanti Bahini 
sympathizer or a terrorist.6 
 
                                                
4 Ibid., 85. 
 
5 Lamia Karim, "Pushed to the Margins: Adivasi Peoples in Bangladesh and the Case of Kalpana," 
Contemporary South Asia 7, no. 3 (1998): 313. 
 
6 Ibid. 
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Like human rights activists and feminists, the member of civil society also try to 
establish their “neutral” image by ignoring the complexity of the politics of Adivasi 
people’s rights. The civil society does not represent general populations of Bangladesh. 
Rather, it is constituted by the members of elite class, including the retired army officers. 
Therefore, an activist who identifies with that civil society is reluctant to raise his or her 
voice against the state’s violence. The civil society serves the interests of the government 
to secure their own powerful position within the society which prevent them from 
seeking justice for all citizens of Bangladesh. 
Therefore, it becomes clear that though feminists, human rights activists, and civil 
society demand for more democratic space they are occupying the dominant ideology of 
national hegemony. But, for establishing solidarity between diverse ethnic groups, these 
activists have to recognize that serious differences exist among and between the subjects 
of the state, and they have to be concerned about the effect their ideology has on groups 
of people they are trying to fight for.7 
 Finally, by failing to effectively involve with other indigenous people’s broader 
movements and establishing solidarity with them, Adivasi people in the CHT remain 
mostly unseen internationally. The main reason for this is the lack of resources of Adivasi 
people to keep in contact with other indigenous people and activists who are struggling 
for similar causes. Though there is Kaptai dam in the CHT that produce most of the 
electricity to meet the demand of Bangladeshi citizens the CHT dwellers have limited 
access to this electricity. There is controlled access of Internet and cell phone in the CHT, 
which the government only allowed in the region ten years ago. Even now, whenever a 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
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conflict situation arises in the CHT the government disconnects all Internet and cell 
phone connections, thus isolating Adivasi people from both national media and activists 
and international ones. Therefore, Adivasi people encounter trouble maintaining contact 
with international audiences which is a necessity for establishing transnational solidarity.  
 From the above analysis, it is clear that there are problems in different levels for 
establishing solidarity within broader sociopolitical contexts. Some problems exist within 
the Adivasi communities, while the others emerge from the ideological hegemony of 
Bengali nation. I believe that to establish Adivasi people’s rights we have to over come 
these problems and build empathy for the common cause, of justice, and equality.  
From Differences to Commonalities 
 
We live in a world where we have to face multifaceted power relations. There is 
no singular power. Rather, there are hierarchies of power systems, such as race, class, 
gender, sexuality, ethnicity, capitalism, and globalism, which work together to create 
controls on people’s lives and bodies. We cannot deduce one from the other. These power 
systems make one group’s lives more valuable than other groups. Through this “matrix of 
domination” differences are conceptualized as a range of interlocking inequalities. In this 
context, where systems of power are so pervasive and do not follow a geographical line, 
individuals or individual communities from a particular geo-political context are not 
strong enough to demolish these systems of power. Moreover, just as the fate of the 
individual is related to other members of communities, so also the fate of individual 
communities is very often related with other communities, both locally and globally. 
Therefore, to challenge the power system by establishing solidarity among communities, 
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the individual community is required to transcend the boundaries of nation-states, 
cultures, and communities.  
 I am arguing for a solidarity that will be transnational as well as national in 
nature. This solidarity has to be capable for organizing people from different 
backgrounds and nation-states to foster social movements depending on common 
political cause, and mobilizing materials and ideological resources within and outside the 
borders of nation states. But, as the broader common political cause has different 
features, images and meanings in different geopolitical contexts, we will not be able to 
follow a uniform strategy for solving different local political problems. So, this solidarity 
also will have to address particular issue and structure specific movement depending on 
particular sociocultural and geopolitical historical contexts. In this way, we will be able 
to set a common political cause on transnational level and at the same time we will be 
able to find specific strategies for our struggling against oppression in a specific context.  
I am not arguing that by establishing solidarity we will be able to erase the 
differences between us. Rather, I am aware about the fact that there are crucial 
differences between individual communities and between individuals. However, there are 
also similarities between them. Because, differences and commonalities exist in relation 
and tension with each other in all contexts.8 Therefore, Mohanty argues that solidarity 
perspective requires the understanding of the historical and experiential specificities and 
                                                
8 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity  
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003). 242. 
 
  81  
   
differences of people as well as the historical and experiential connections between 
people from different national, racial, and cultural communities.9 She claims, 
Differences are never just “differences.” In knowing differences and 
particularities, we can better see the connections and commonalities because no 
border or boundary is ever complete or rigidly determining. The challenge is to 
see how differences allow us to explain the connections and border crossings 
better and more accurately, how specifying difference allows us to theorize 
universal concerns more fully.10 
 
It is this intellectual motivation that leads me to advocate solidarity among people 
who seek justice. So, by urging for solidarity, I am not contending that we all are alike, 
nor am I arguing that our blood, our color, our pains, our aims, our sagas, our dreams, our 
hopes and our struggles are same. All I am arguing is that there are some points where 
our different political choices cross cut with each other, and those points are the ground 
where we share commonalities, similar experiences. These points are the grounds where 
we will be able to create new social category –“strategic community” –the community 
that will not unite around any particular race, ethnicity, class, gender, religion, or sexual 
orientation, but will have common cause for achieving strategic goals.   
As all the racial, ethnic, national, gender, sexual categorizations have been made 
by interlocking systems of inequality, differences within and between these 
categorizations are conceptualized through hierarchical systems of power. For 
establishing a new “strategic community” based on common political choice, we have to 
go beyond these categorizations. However, this does not mean that as a member of 
strategic community we will not consider our different experiences that have shaped by 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid., 226. 
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social classifications. Rather, it means that as a member of new strategic community our 
political interest will be same, which is establishing justice for people who are being 
deprived of it. As a member of our specific group we will acknowledge our different 
experiences of oppressions and design varied strategies for fighting against oppressive 
power structure. This community bond has to be developed depending on shared political 
choice not on shared experiences. Shared experience can be one motivation for 
establishing solidarity, but we will not be able to build broader solidarity only depending 
on our shared experiences. If we only emphasize on shared experiences it will ultimately 
limited our space and hinder coalition building with those people who do not share our 
experiences. For example, if we just give importance to shared experiences then Bengalis 
may not be able to establish empathy with Adivasi people in Bangladesh as they have 
different experiences of oppression. But, if we emphasize common political choice then 
we may be able to reach both groups who share similar experiences with us and who are 
not, but seek an end to oppression. And in this way, a Bengali group, as well as people 
from other nationalities, who are not indigenous people but support establishing 
indigenous people’s rights, can join together with Adivasi people in Bangladesh. 
Common political ground will be the starting point, from where we will be able to create 
our new strategic identity that is the prerequisite for establishing solidarity within and 
beyond the sociocultural and geopolitical borders.  
It is true that in these very fragmented times establishing solidarity through 
creating strategic community is very difficult. However, when identities are so fluid that 
labor, capital, and militaries cross geo-political margins and oppressions and dominations 
transcend the boundaries of nation-states, then possibilities of this new identity and 
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solidarity are also viable. We can create a common platform based on our common 
political goal for Adivasi people’s rights, which includes women’s rights. In this way, we 
will be able to organize collective actions at diverse levels in fluid and flexible ways that 
will transcend the borders of nation-states. We will also be able to raise our voice against 
states, corporations and institutions of neoliberal governance and call for alternative 
values, institutions and relations.  
  There are several women’s and indigenous people’s networks that have already 
built partnerships with other marginal groups. Transnational feminist activism is 
mobilizing its force against neoliberal globalization, militarism, war and patriarchal 
fundamentalism for establishing women’s rights.11 For example, Bat Shalom in West 
Jerusalem has established partnership with a similar center established by Palestinian 
women in East Jerusalem, an alliance they called “The Jerusalem Link.” This link is 
demanding an end to the occupation and the creation of a fully independent Palestine 
state as well as working to develop the relations between Jewish and Palestine Arab 
women within the state Israel.12 The aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 galvanized women’s anti-war and anti-military movements. In both India 
and Pakistan women’s groups joined in coalitions that condemned the massacre of 
American civilians on September 11 but also asked United States to take responsibility 
for the fallout from past foreign policies and to refrain from military retaliation in 
                                                
11 Valentine M. Moghadam, Globalization & Social Movement: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global 
Justice Movement  (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009). 34. 
 
12 Cynthia Cockburn, "Bat Shalom: A Women's Group for Peace," in The Space between Us: Negotiating 
Gender and National Identities in Conflict (New York: Zed Books, 1998). 
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Afghanistan which would very likely cause considerable civilian death and sufferings.13  
There are some other groups –WIB (Women in Black), WILPF, Women Strike for Peace, 
Code Pink, Women for Women International, Association of Women of the 
Mediterranean Region, Medica Mondiale who are trying to “engender” peace, nuclear 
disarmament, and human rights.14  
There are some Human rights networks, which are fostering indigenous people’s 
rights movements to demolish overlapping forms of subjugation of marginal people’s 
lives. For example, Survival International is trying to mobilize people from all over the 
world for protecting the Mashco-Piro indigenous group in Peru from the increased 
violence caused by the government, logging, mining companies who are trying to force 
them off their land.15 In a similar way, Amazon Watch has established the campaign 
named “Stop the Belo Monte Dam” for fighting against the Brazilian government’s plan 
to build the third largest dam in the world in the Xingu river that will displace twenty 
four thousand indigenous people in that region.16 In 2010, American filmmaker James 
Cameron came to Brazil to take up the cause of fighting against the dam and last year, 
more than one million Brazilians signed a petition against the dam in less than a week. 
All of these movements are transnational social movements that have include 
“constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with 
                                                
13 Moghadam, Globalization & Social Movement: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement: 
81. 
 
14 Ibid., 71. 
 
15 “Peru Struggles to Protect Indian Tribe,” Aljazeera, February 1, 2012 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/02/201221152019610835.html 
 
16 “Dam It: Brazil’s Belo Monte Stirs Controversy,” Aljazeera, January 20, 2012 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/201212015366764400.html 
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power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international 
institution, or a multinational economic actor.”17 These movements are targeting both 
states and global orders. Through these ongoing movements we can learn about how to 
create and activate global networks to mobilize pressure within and outside states, how to 
participate multilateral, intra and inter-governmental political arenas, how to act and 
agitate within and outside the boundaries of nation-states and how to enhance awareness 
and participations of people from different part of the world for establishing Adivasi 
people’s rights. Apart from learning the strategies for fostering social movements and 
building new community based on common cause, we also have to engage with these 
kinds of network, so that we can exchange information, understanding, resources and 
supports for helping each other. 
 There is a sign of hope for Adivasi people in the CHT, as there are some networks 
that are trying to build solidarity within broader sociopolitical context. One of them is 
“Jouno Nipiron Protirodh Moncho” (Platform Against Sexual Violence). This platform is 
trying to bring together people from different backgrounds, considering both class and 
nationality and including indigenous people’s movements.18 The goal is to establish 
solidarity on issues of gender violence that include sexual harassment, eviction of slums 
and brothels, environment policies of state and the politics of oil exportation. This is a 
positive indication that some of the issues connecting gender and ethnicity that were 
previously absent from the mainstream women’s movement are now being recognized. 
                                                
17 Moghadam, Globalization & Social Movement: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement: 
31. 
 
18 Meghna Guhathakurta, "Women Negotiating Change: The Structure and Transformation of Gendered 
Violence in Bangladesh," Cultural Dynamics 16(2004): 206. 
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 But, it is not enough. A stronger solidarity has to be built within and outside 
Bangladesh for bringing about positive social change. The strategic community and 
solidarity by itself will not override the forces of domination. But, it is the foundation for 
a broader coalition politics that will foster democratic government that recognized the 
human rights of all people. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the context of the historical marginalization of Adivasi people in the CHT, 
Bangladesh, this research has explored how mainstream researches and writings on 
Adivasi issues have ignored Adivasi women by subsuming women’s distinctive problems 
within the communities’ marginalization. Through this research I have investigated 
Adivasi women’s subordination in diverse sphere of life and their activism against the 
power structure that mainstream researches have overlooked. This paper has argued that 
violence against Adivasi women needs to be understood by taking account of the 
intersections of racial, ethnic, gender, class marginalization that have been shaping their 
lives.  
We have seen that Adivasi women encounter discrimination and violence not only 
as members of minority ethnic community, but also as women and as members of 
marginal class. The interconnections of different system of inequality have made Adivasi 
women’s marginalization more intense and different from communities’ marginalization. 
The Adivasi people of Bangladesh are ubiquitously absent as subjects, as actors, as 
agents in the national imagination; they are invisible in the administrative, educational, 
economical systems, and in the popular media. In spite of their invisibility in the 
mainstream scenario of Bangladesh, their marginality, their experiences are not an 
entirely untold story. Rather, the discrimination, deprivation and exploitation in the CHT 
have attracted attention of national and international scholars and audiences.  But,
  88  
 
Adivasi women’s distinctive experiences remain unseen both within political arena and 
academic field. On the one hand, they are sexually, economically, politically 
discriminated by dominant ethnic group Bengali and their militia. On the other hand, by 
living within patriarchal society, Adivasi women face gender-based discrimination and 
violence in all spheres of lives within their household and their communities. They have 
no inheritance rights, parental rights over their children, they encounter sexual violence 
within their family, and they cannot participate equally in their religious rituals. They join 
actively in the social-movement against all discrimination caused by state, but they are 
not the ones who take decision in social matters or in the household.  Therefore, their 
relegated position within their own communities as well as Bangladeshi state establish 
them as a distinctive ‘other.’ Despite the fact that they have distinctive experiences of 
oppression, Adivasi women’s sagas have remained almost unheard, and their unique 
marginalization, agency, strategy have remained mostly unseen. The state leaders, 
activists, scholars and journalists have alienated Adivasi women from those issues – 
peace Accord, land rights, violence against Adivasi people and politics of nationalism –
that are considered as main issues for talking about Adivasi people.  
 Surrounding the issue of peace treaty signed by the Bangladeshi government and 
PCJSS, scholars and politicians have debated with each other on the topic of whether 
peace treaty is implemented properly or not. But, they often have paid little attention that 
how Adivasi women have become invisible in the journey towards peace. The CHT 
peace Accord is a gendered treaty representing men’s interests as it completely excludes 
Adivasi women’s roles from three steps of peace building process. 
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Firstly, in spite of women’s unique insights for establishing peace, Adivasi 
women’s active participation in the struggle of self-determination, and the UN’s demand 
for women’s participation in conflict resolution process, not a single Adivasi woman was 
present in the peace talk through which the government and PCJSS had come to an 
agreement and signed the Accord. Secondly, the language of the peace Accord does not 
specify Adivasi women’s rights and distinctive problems, which is demonstrated in the 
fact that there is no provision for the inheritance rights of women and for the 
rehabilitation of the rape victims or domestic violence victims in the peace Accord. There 
is no attempt taken by either the government or PCJSS for increasing women’s 
participation in the politics. Rather, there is gender imbalance and male hegemonism in 
the local politics that disregards Adivasi women’s sacrifices and participation in the 
peace-building activities. Thirdly, the Accord does not mention Adivasi women’s 
involvement in effecting peace building process in the post Accord period. Considering 
these facts, we can say that the gender question has remained unresolved both within the 
purview of hill politics as well as between hill organizations and Bengali civil society 
groups. However, very few researchers and political leaders have recognized that peace 
cannot be established without engaging the whole, rather than half of the population in 
the CHT.  
In a similar way, researchers have failed to see the facts that alienation from land 
has affected Adivasi women distinctively. The Adivasi women have unique relationships 
with their nature and lands. They become vulnerable when the state alienates Adivasi 
people from their land, as women’s security, mobility, livelihood, equal participation in 
the cultivation has always been structured by their relationships with their lands. 
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 There are large numbers of army and other security personnel and Bengalis in the 
rural areas of the CHT, where indigenous women move about to collect water, fuel and 
fodder. Adivasi women are sexually and verbally harassed and assaulted by security 
personnel and Bengali settlers, when they have to go outside their home for their daily 
activities.1 Therefore, being insecure in their own land Adivasi women often feel required 
to limit their mobility. Moreover, there are an increasing number of Adivasi women who 
become responsible to search for new means of livelihood both within and outside the 
CHT because of the absence of male members who either were killed or forced to flee to 
India. This exposes Adivasi women to new forms of vulnerabilities. On the one hand, 
they are deprived from getting a proper wage for their labor or good price for their 
product. On the other hand, they face sexual and physical abuse in their workplace. In 
addition, alienation from their own land and the presence of Bengali settlers and the 
Army also has affected Adivasi women’s education. In the time of insurgency or in any 
conflict situation, when the family incomes decline then often the price will be the 
education of the girl-child.2 Moreover, Adivasi girls who live in remote areas find it 
difficult to attend school, because there is always threat for sexual violence from settler 
Bengalis and Army.  
However, Adivasi women also are deprived from their rights to land for the 
traditional patriarchal rules of inheritance. With the exception of the Marma Adivasi 
ethnic group, women in Adivasi communities do not have equal inheritance rights. Since 
men inherit the wealth and land of the family, in Adivasi societies men are more valued 
                                                
1 Halim, "Insecurity of Indigenous Women," 185. 
 
2 Guhathakurta, "Women's Survival and Resistances," 80. 
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than women.3 Their inheritance status within their own communities along with 
government’s forced eviction policy and settlement of Bengalis in Adivasi lands have 
pushed them to live in the margin. Therefore, Adivasi women have to juggle between 
their own communities and protecting themselves from the ongoing war, the war that 
remain unseen within the domain of politics and academia.  
Another unseen aspect of Adivasi women’s lives is sexual violence. When 
researchers and scholars analyze state violence against minority groups they often focus 
on the general scenario of the violence and assume that it affect all minority people 
equally. However, the effects of violence on women have distinctive nature. Violence 
against them arises from within and beyond the ethnic boundary. On the one hand, 
Adivasi women encounter violence within their own communities. Their suffering remain 
invisible and unheard, as Adivasi women do not want to speak about the domestic or 
community violence to protect their families and communities’ “honor.”  On the other 
hand, they encounter sexual violence by dominant group. We know that woman’s body 
becomes the central point for national politics, for the internalization and intensification 
of masculine ethos that considers women as symbols of collective purity and honor.4 This 
becomes evident in the conflict between Adivasi people and the Bangladeshi state, where 
rape has been used as an instrument of war against the purity and authenticity of Adivasi 
identity.5 Among the many crimes committed against the people of the Hill Tracts, sexual 
violence such as rape, gang rape, molestation, abduction and sexual harassment are 
                                                
3 Ibid., 84. 
 
4 Naher and Tripura, "Understanding Violence Against Indigenous Women in bangladesh," 9. 
 
5 Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh. 
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prevalent. However, Adivasi women not only encounter rape, but also they are face 
sexual and verbal harassment in their daily lives by security forces and Bengali settlers. 
Compared to the conflict period, the post conflict time is more unmanageable for 
Adivasi women, because their experiences of violence has changed their lives and 
relationships with their worlds. Adivasi women do not get justice due to the lack of 
effective measures taken by government officials, civil society, human right 
organizations, local Adivasi communities and political party. Adivasi women who are the 
victims of sexual violence not only suffer when failing to get justice, but also by getting 
alienated from their own society and family, who leave them to avoid social humiliation. 
Financial crisis also contributes additional insecurity in their lives. Very often raped 
women loose their jobs, especially if people come to know about the incident. The 
victims of sexual violence often suffer psychological trauma. Consequently, they start to 
hate and blame themselves and also start to believe that all men are perpetrators. Very 
often victims of sexual violence fail to attend school, which effects their studies. 
Therefore, the affects of sexual violence are not always immediately visible. Rather, there 
are long-term implications for the individual and society at large, which are difficult to 
calculate. The women, who are the victims of sexual violence, suffer most but the 
government as well as feminist and human rights organizations fail to understand the 
class, gender, and ethnic dimension of the violence. 
Adivasi women are also marginal in the politics of nationalism. As nationalism is 
gendered and springs from masculinized hope, and is always biased towards powerful 
groups, both Bengalis, Bangladeshi and Jumma nationalisms become the narratives of the 
triumphs of national male figures. Therefore, on the one hand, both the government and 
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Adivasi local leaders have failed to consolidate Adivasi women’s issues in the agenda of 
different versions of nationalism. On the other hand, to establish themselves in highest 
political power position in the CHT, male Bengali as well as Adivasi leaders have 
submerged the contributions of Adivasi women’s activists in the political struggle and 
have tried to impede women leaders and activists’ involvement in the political sphere. In 
this way, Adivasi women’s questions have been submerged within the rubrics of 
dominant narratives and politics.  
Despite all of the socio-political hindrance that Adivasi women are facing, they 
are fighting for establishing Adivasi women’ as well as communities’ rights, which are 
proving that Adivasi women are not passive victims. Rather, they have long legacy of 
activism. They have fought in the battlefield with Shantibahini comrades. They extended 
their active support and cooperation especially in terms of disseminating information and 
carrying letters and other secret documents for the fighters in the insurgency period. They 
worked and risked their lives as informants, and got molested, abused and raped by the 
military. Now they are participating in the political struggle for self-determination of 
Adivasi people, fostering cultural movement and resisting the dominant patriarchal 
societies as well as state power in their daily lives. They are trying to raise women’s 
awareness and make them economically independent.  
The militant role that women often played in their communities is best 
exemplified by the bravery displayed by their Organizing Secretary of HWF, Kalpana 
Chakma. Although the fate of Kalpana Chakma still remains unknown to the public, she 
left behind a new generation of Adivasi women activists who not only speak up against 
injustices committed by organized forces of state, but also take a stance against gender 
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inequality within their own communities. Several of these new generation activists are 
not only fighting in the battlefiled, but also fostering cultural movement against dominant 
power structures 
These women are courageous, as it is not safe or easy for women to resist 
oppressors who enjoy the backing of dominant groups. Especially, living in a militarized 
conflict zone, where their lives are in constant threat, it has never been easy for Adivasi 
women to actively participating in their political struggles. However, no threat, or 
violence has been able to stop them. They remain in the field with their courage to 
continue their war for establishing their rights.  
I believe that individual community’s efforts are not enough for bringing about 
positive social change. Rather, we can end the ethnic conflict and hostile relationships 
between Adivasis and Bengalis by establishing solidarity that will be transnational as 
well as national in nature. This solidarity has to be capable for organizing people from 
different backgrounds and nation-states to foster social movements depending on 
common political cause, and mobilizing materials and ideological resources within and 
outside the borders of nation states. Simultaneously, this solidarity will also have to be 
able acknowledge our different experiences of oppressions to choose different strategies 
for fighting against oppressive power structure. 
The reason behind establishing solidarity is not to ignore the differences between 
us. The differences between us are important, because our different experiences of 
oppressions will provide us different strategies for fighting against dominant group. But, 
there are some points where our different political choices cross cut with each other, and 
those points are the ground where we share similarities and that will be the platform 
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where we will build coalition with each other. This solidarity has to be developed 
depending on shared political choice not only on shared experiences. I am not ignoring 
the importance of shared experience. Building solidarity based on shared experiences can 
be a possible pathway for establishing empathy, but we will not be able to build broader 
solidarity only depending on our shared experiences. Because, if we only emphasize 
shared experiences it will ultimately limited our common space and hinder us to establish 
bond with those people who have different experiences than us. But, by prioritizing 
common political choice we will be able to reach those people who may have not similar 
historical experiences of oppression. And in this way, Bengali group, as well as people 
from other nationalities, who are not indigenous people but support indigenous people’s 
rights, can join together with Adivasi people’s movements in Bangladesh. Therefore, 
common political ground should be the platform from where we will start our journey, 
the journey for establishing solidarity beyond and within the sociocultural and 
geopolitical borders.  
I believe that if Adivasi people want to be the actors of their own histories and 
creators of a new world, free from all kinds of abuse, they have to be united and establish 
coalition with broader networks. Our primary coalition can pave the way for broader, 
more profound, more long range and more long lasting solidarity. There is possibility that 
we may not be able to establish any solidarity. But the important thing is we should try. 
Because like Martin Luther King I believe that “Change does not roll in on the wheels of 
inevitability, but comes through continuous struggle. And so we must straighten our 
backs and work for our freedom.”   
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